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The Myth of the Soviet Soldier:  






 To date, there has been an astonishing dearth of analysis on the ways in which enlisted 
personnel within the United States are presented with concepts of the outside world, and even 
less so on how this drastically differs from an American cultural zeitgeist. As Cold War 
ramifications continue to guide our modern contexts, this investigation looks into the split 
between American civilian and military representations of an ephemeral Soviet identity. This 
contrasting application of ethnography allows a new opportunity to examine how the United 
States military – an entity typically thought of as monolithic and unwieldy – navigated complex 
issues of identity politics and national antagonisms through internal educational publications. 
Embodied in their training materials, the Department of the Army demonstrates itself as 
surprisingly complex, agile, and measured in its portrayal of the Soviet and Russian opponent – 
especially when contrasted against certain exaggerations and stereotypes present in twentieth-
century cultural products.  
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Introduction 
Imagine the year is 1988. You are in your late teens, and you are out one last time with 
friends to see the movie Red Heat before heading off to basic training.1 The next morning a 
jovial driver in a drab green bus picks you up from your hometown, and you spend some time 
being shuttled to the nearest United States Army base. After arriving you bid farewell to your 
civilian clothes and don your own personal Battle Dress Uniform. Your newly trimmed hair 
seems light, leaving you feeling somehow more exposed. You are herded into a classroom filled 
with long tables and folding chairs. Other recruits, all from vastly different walks of life, are 
seated there. You settle in as your instructor walks in toward the dark green chalkboard, a bulky 
manual underneath his arm. In small barely legible print he simply writes “The Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics” in stark white chalk. Immediately, you wrack your brain trying to remember 
everything you have heard about the Soviets. You have seen some news reports about their 
presence in Afghanistan – pretty gruesome stuff. They are the usual bad guys in some of your 
favorite books and movies. A couple of your acquaintances in school may have been a members 
of the local Communist Party USA chapter, but you were never quite sure. You knew that some 
of their supporters cheered them on – they were the saviors of blue collar workers. But didn’t 
President Reagan just have the embassy in Moscow torn down? With all of these pictures 
floating in your mind, you lean back and listen as your gruff-looking instructor begins to lecture 
you on who exactly the Soviets are. 
The final decades of the Cold War saw a precipitous collapse of the global dichotomy 
between two seemingly immovable superpowers. Prior to this point, however, the fate of the 
world was often couched in the outcome of this struggle. Terms like “mutually assured 
destruction”, “non-aligned”, “democratic”, “interventionist”, “socialist”, and “communist” all 
became points of contention on a scale where two national identities were at stake. Before 
George H.W. Bush could announce communism’s death in 1992, there was the threat of 
mutually assured destruction and nuclear winter. Prior to Germany’s reunification in 1990, 
millions of United States citizens signed on to defend democracy and freedom on a global scale. 
Thousands of films, songs, movies, and newspapers were crafted in the American cultural 
crucible in reaction to a conflict that never quite got officially started. It was an era of 
                                                          
1 Red Heat, directed by Walter Hill (1988; Culver City, CA: TriStar Pictures, 2001) DVD. 
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oppression, suspicion, fear and accusation. Almost every aspect of American Cold War culture 
has been picked apart in a global attempt to understand how the world was able to walk to – and 
step away from – the precipice of nuclear annihilation and total war. One aspect of American 
life, however, has been surprisingly absent from these studies: the perspective of the military 
itself. While scholars and analysts have picked apart the military industrial complex, foreign 
policy, and Cold War conflicts across the world in detail, the social and lived experiences of the 
US citizen-soldier and his instructors have been left by the wayside. This thesis seeks to 
delineate the complex ways in which American military training in the final decades of the Cold 
War vastly diverged from the larger civilian cultural narrative, notably in the ways in which it 
represented a nebulous Soviet identity. 
I will begin by examining the contents of a number of different military manuals 
published throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. By signalling out their language, I will show 
how they craft a depiction of the Soviet ‘Other’ which diverges greatly from the stereotypes 
found in some Cold War popular culture. This will then be followed by an examination into the 
evolution of scholarship on military training within Western nations in order to demonstrate that, 
while the field has evolved, there are still significant gaps that need to be filled. Training 
manuals, and what they reveal about military education, are one such lacunae. Next I briefly 
describe the successive waves of American popular culture which established a certain 
construction of the Soviet soldier in the minds of average Americans. Finally, through a close 
reading of the manuals produced by the American military, I show how these presented a much 
more reasoned and dispassionate analysis of the Soviet ‘Other’. This involves a specific focus on 
the positive rhetoric, restrained critique, recognition of Soviet difference, and the measured 
description of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons within the manuals themselves. 
Ultimately, my analysis reveals not only a divergence between the martial and civilian spheres of 
understanding the Soviet Union and its inhabitants, but that the American military understood – 
and thus portrayed – their opponents as complex entities worthy of respect and admiration 
instead of as cartoonish stereotypes. 
The task of imagining the typical Soviet soldier was not an easy one; it was a subjective, 
relative, and ultimately transient exercise. Yet despite this, there were some common 
associations which remained in all of the abstract personifications written about Soviet military 
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forces. Soviet soldiers were assumed to be a diverse group, but united across an almost 
unimaginably vast territory by a core sets of beliefs and a domineering leadership. They had 
endured some of the most horrific violence and brutal fighting in recorded human history. The 
soldiers had contradictory moments of both brilliant tactical and technological advancement, as 
well as of corrupt abuse and stagnation-inspiring neglect. As musician Paul McCartney said in 
2003, as he reflected on the wild popularity of the 1969 single “Back in the USSR,” the Soviet 
Union “was a mystical land then,”2 and its inhabitants were just as foreign to Western audiences 
as the land itself. 
In American popular culture, the Soviets were surrounded by an air of mystery. Despite a 
world-encompassing competition in technology, sports, and culture, it seemed that very few 
Westerners truly understood what life was like beyond the Iron Curtain. Inevitably, the lack of 
knowledge led to fear and suspicion in certain circles. Following the uneasy division of post-war 
Germany, the Soviets began appearing in various mediums as a familiar boogeyman, ranging 
from overt bringers of nuclear death, to much more subtle and undermining communist 
infiltrators of United States society. The anti-Soviet zeitgeist diffused and ingrained itself into 
the minds of the Western public, producing cultural touchstones like Bert the Turtle, who taught 
young students to ‘duck and cover’ during an anticipated nuclear attack from the Soviet side of 
the world.3 Plays, films, newspapers, music, and cartoons – almost every medium showed some 
signs of Cold War influences. A children’s board game, for example, instructed members of the 
free world to “find a way to keep war-makers like Mao” from “shedding the blood of innocent 
people.”4 Advertisements followed a similar path, as companies such as the Bohn Aluminum and 
Brass Corporation described socialism with derision and hatred. While we must be careful not to 
generalize all (or even a majority) of society as sharing these perspectives, it is at least safe to 
say that few who grew up under the shadow of the Cold War could claim to be immune to its 
influence. However, while the civilian side of Cold War culture has been examined at length, the 
militarized aspect of it presents a different, less-studied, narrative. 
                                                          
2 Kevin O’Flynn, “Paul McCartney Finally Back in the U.S.S.R.,” The Moscow Times, May 26, 2003, Web, 
Accessed March 8, 2017, http://old.themoscowtimes.com/sitemap/free/2003/5/article/paul-mccartney-finally-back-
in-the-ussr/238263.html/ 
3 Bryan Hubbarb, “Civil Defense: More than Duck and Cover,” Military.com: Military Headlines, Web, Accessed 
March 8, 2017, http://www.military.com/Content/MoreContent1/?file=cw_cd_story 
4 “War-Maker,” Fight the Red Menace (Philadelphia: Bowman Gum, 1951), board game, PDF. 
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Alon Confino, in his 1997 work The Nation as a Local Metaphor, stated that veterans 
became the “custodians of the history”5 for subsequent generations during Germany’s 
unification. The same sentiment could be argued to pervade Western societies in the post-war 
period, as militarization increasingly became a foundational aspect of American national policy 
and daily life. Annually, the United States has spent more on its military forces than the next 7 
nations combined – $596 billion to the comparative $567.2 billion of China, Saudi Arabia, 
Russia, the United Kingdom, India, France, Japan, and Germany in 2015 alone.6 With over 1.3 
million active personnel, a return to civilian life diffuses service members into a range of post-
tour positions, ranging from successfully managing Fortune 500 companies, running for 
presidential office, returning to previous hobbies and professions, or along the difficult roads of 
psychological and/or physical recovery. Yet, all members of the United States Armed Forces, 
past or present, are perceived to speak with an authority given to them by their unimaginable 
experiences. As Christopher J. Fettweis notes, the influence of regional commanders in chief – 
America’s warrior-diplomats – have “steadily grown in importance in all levels of U.S. foreign 
affairs” since the passage of Goldwater-Nichols in 1986.7 Culturally, American militarism has 
allowed armed forces and soldiers to regularly rank highly positive in public opinion polls.8 The 
term ‘veteran’ is invoked with veneration, and one need only look toward the immaculate Tomb 
of the Unknown Soldier or the restrained celebrations of November 11 to gauge the respect given 
to enlisted men and women in twentieth and twenty-first century America. 
Section 1 – Historiography 
Despite this ability to influence thinking in both everyday conversation and national 
discourse, little critical assessment has been made of one of the fundamental hallmarks of the 
typical soldier’s experience – his or her beginnings at military educational institutes. The field of 
                                                          
5 Alon Confino, The Nation as a Local Metaphor: Wurttemberg, Imperial Germany, and National Memory, 1871-
1918 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 43. 
6 “Military expenditure,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Web accessed March 8, 2017, 
https://www.sipri.org/research/armament-and-disarmament/arms-transfers-and-military-spending/military-
expenditure 
7 Christopher J. Fettweis, “Militarizing Diplomacy: Warrior-Diplomats and the Foreign Policy Process,” in 
America’s Viceroys: The Military and U.S. Foreign Policy, ed. Derek S. Reveron (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2004), 47. Further discussion can also be found in Suzanne C. Nielsen and Don M. Snider, eds., American Civil-
Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009). 
8 Andrew J. Bacevich, The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 23. 
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military history has always been rife with descriptive surveys and theoretical debate on esoteric 
tactics and strategy. Traditional historiography provides a vast array of top-down political 
interpretations of global or local conflicts, and the cultural turn of the late twentieth century has 
spurred many forays into a social examination of war experience, trauma, and an ongoing 
interaction between war and society. Nevertheless, there is a surprising dearth of attempts by 
historians to investigate an aspect of military life that may have a large impact on service 
members and their post-service lives. To date, what little that has been written on military 
education has primarily been a commentary on contemporary American national contexts, rather 
than investigations into, or critical assessments of, the actual content of training manuals, college 
curricula, and educational methods. Before delving into what specific myth of the Soviet soldier 
has been fostered in American military communities, we must first turn toward what has been 
written on armed forces training in the past seventy-odd years. While military theorists, officers, 
and educators have spent countless man-hours researching and debating how and why to train 
soldiers in a specific manner, historians have largely fallen behind in this regard, releasing a 
scant few works on the subject. What does exist in terms of Armed Forces curricula analysis, 
however, can be organized into six separate phases.  
Phase One: The Post-War Political Focus [1945-1960] 
To borrow the words of David Ludden, the post-war era experienced a form of 
imperialism in an entirely “new format under American leadership.”9 Throughout this era of 
decolonization, the United States seemed to be the first among equals. It portrayed itself as the 
champion of democracy, founding a “project of […] hegemony within the Western world.”10 In 
supposed opposition to this was the rising influence of the USSR – an ideological adversary the 
likes of which American leadership had only just recently faced in the defeated Third Reich. In 
an effort to similarly stymy Soviet power, political advisor George F. Kennan proposed a policy 
of global control – a “patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive 
tendencies.”11 Political lines were drawn and President Harry S. Truman declared that every 
                                                          
9 David Ludden, “America’s Invisible Empire,” Economic and Political Weekly 39, No. 44 (Oct. 30 – Nov. 5, 2004): 
4776. 
10 Ian Tyrrell, “Empire in American History,” in Colonial Crucible: Empire in the Making of the Modern State, eds. 
Alfred W. McCoy and Francisco A. Scarano (Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2009), 546. 
11 George F. Kennan [Under pseudonym ‘X’], “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs 25, No. 4 (Jul., 
1947), 575. 
R i c e  | 6 
nation “must choose between alternative ways of life,” and, if having chosen correctly, could 
rely on American support to maintain their “freedoms.”12 Faced with the Truman Doctrine of 
global intervention, the Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin condemned the “dollar imperialism” 
and hypocritical attitudes of American politicians.13 
This juxtaposition between democracy and communism – perceived freedom versus 
totalitarianism14 – invariably led to a series of indirect pushes for power. Entire organizations, 
such as the Office of International and Cultural Affairs (later branded in 1953 as the United 
States Information Agency), were founded in the service of this narrative.15 Academics were 
similarly recruited into the service of this new political dichotomy as “Sovietology” – the study 
of the Soviet Union through the meagre evidence that escaped the Iron Curtain – became an 
ongoing field of scholarship. 
John W. Masland and Laurence I. Radwar’s volume, Soldiers and Scholars: Military 
Education and National Policy (1957), acts as one of the first academic forays into Armed 
Forces curricula in the immediate post-war period. Aiming to rectify the “paucity of published 
material on military education” - which has largely been “little more than descriptive 
accounts”,16 Masland and Radwar critically analyzed the scholastic programs of defense 
institutes throughout the United States. With a specific focus on the Army, Naval, and Air War 
Colleges, 300 interviews and 550 questionnaires of active-duty personnel were used to obtain a 
small glimpse into the capabilities and faults of these pedagogical organizations. Little 
theoretical basis was given by the authors – only that the investigation was solidly entrenched in 
                                                          
12 Harry S. Truman, "Special Message to the Congress on Greece and Turkey: The Truman Doctrine," March 12, 
1947, Web, Accessed April 4, 2015, The American Presidency Project, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12846. 
13 Laura A. Belmonte, Selling the American Way: U.S. Propaganda and the Cold War (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 30. 
14 The terms “communism” and “totalitarianism”, in the case of American educational rhetoric, were often used 
synonymously. Little (if any) mention was made toward concepts of socialism or Marxist-Leninism in lieu of the 
umbrella term “communism”. Understanding the socio-political organization of the U.S.S.R. was evidently left to 
Sovietologists and Kremlinologists. 
15 While explanation of this topic would be extensive, the successes and controversies of public diplomacy are well 
documented in both Nicholas J. Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American 
Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) and Yale 
Richmond, Practicing Public Diplomacy: A Cold War Odyssey (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008). 
16 John W. Masland and Laurence I. Radwar, Soldiers and Scholars: Military Education and National Policy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), xvi. 
R i c e  | 7 
a civilian “philosophy of education.”17 Supposedly, Radwar and Masland used their experiences 
as professors in liberal arts colleges as a jumping-off point for evaluating their military 
counterparts, hoping to apply similar rubrics to find faults and methods of improvement.   
Perhaps the most important aspect of the work lies in its overarching theme of how 
Armed Forces officers have increasingly broad, non-military roles in the developing Cold War 
context. Graduates of military institutes found themselves entwined with the development of 
national and foreign policy. Supervision of conquered territories like Japan and Germany put the 
three services on the same footing as the diplomatic branch of the Department of State. Typical 
soldiers became less conventional as the 1940s and 1950s passed, gathering knowledge of 
economic development and diplomatic mediation to supplement their technical military training. 
They would be active facilitators of propaganda and not passive targets of it. The domestic 
situation was similarly fluid, and it became much more difficult to “locate a dividing line 
between […] military and civilian personnel.”18 Masland and Radwar argue that World War II 
“drastically changed the role of the United States in world affairs,”19 and contemporary 
educational programs were adapting to fit and exceed these new requirements of the everyday 
officer and soldier.20 Not only were soldiers being molded with these concepts in mind, they 
were specifically contrasted against a “rise of hostile forces in the Far East and Europe.”21 The 
adapting role of military leaders necessitated a “heightened awareness of the principles of our 
democratic society.”22 It is through this lens that schools and colleges were judged in the late 
1950s. 
Two years later Education and Military Leadership: A Study of the R.O.T.C (1959) was 
also released by Masland, this time in partnership with Gene M. Lyons. The focus of the work 
turned towards the Reserve Officer Training Corps – a training program that was (and continues 
to be) embedded within traditional university campuses. With similar frameworks, questions, and 
methods as its predecessor, Education and Military Leadership examined how the civilian source 
of career officers had also adapted to changing national contexts. As with the previous work, 
                                                          
17 Masland and Radwar, Soldiers and Scholars, xvi. 
18 Masland and Radwar, Soldiers and Scholars, 10. 
19 Masland and Radwar, Soldiers and Scholars, 100. 
20 Masland and Radwar, Soldiers and Scholars, 503. 
21 Masland and Radwar, Soldiers and Scholars, 6. 
22 Masland and Radwar, Soldiers and Scholars, 10. 
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Lyons’ and Masland’s arguments were once again couched in the rhetoric of national security as 
well as the preservation and survival of democratic freedom. It was of the utmost importance that 
the “human resources of the nation […] be utilized effectively for the highest national 
purpose.”23 Military education was thus viewed purely in those terms –of creating the armed 
branch of political (democratic) forces. Analysis was solely for the purpose of assessing how 
each college lived up to the new requirements of complex post-war years. Success or failure 
improved or weakened American global standing, and very little regard was given to the faceless 
soldiers who entered and left military institutions.  
Phase Two: The Economic Nod [1960s] 
The next stage of analysis took the form of an economic understanding of the military’s 
educational system. The post-war trade and industry boom catapulted the American economy 
into a new age of expansion, referred to as the “Golden Age of Capitalism” wherein businesses 
flourished, employment rates were high, the stock market began to recover, and inflation 
remained stable.24 President John F. Kennedy ran and served on a platform that supported 
economic growth, and Lyndon B. Johnson followed suit during his succession in 1963. However, 
many of the systems and programs that facilitated this growth began to deteriorate in the second 
half of the 1960s, and budgetary concerns increasingly drew attention to the vast financial 
burden of the Department of Defense (DoD). Catalyzed by Dwight D. Eisenhower’s 1961 
farewell address, the “military-industrial complex,”25 and the scholastic institutes attached to it, 
were brought into question by the academic thinkers. 
In writing Education in the Armed Forces (1965), James C. Shelburne and Kenneth J. 
Groves illuminated the exact cost of educating and training one of the most powerful military 
forces on the planet. Bemoaning the naivety of the average American taxpayer, the two authors 
attempted to show just how far the defense budget went to produce competent and 
knowledgeable enlisted soldiers and commissioned officers. Essentially, the purpose of the 
                                                          
23 Gene M. Lyons and John W. Masland, Education and Military Leadership: A Study of the R.O.T.C. (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1959), 210. 
24 Stephen A. Marglin and Juliet B. Schor, The Golden Age of Capitalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1991), 13. 
25 Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Farewell Radio and Television Address to the American People," January 17, 1961, 
Web, Accessed April 4, 2015, The American Presidency Project, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12086. 
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volume was to describe the “expensive, expansive, and most effective educational system” in the 
United States.26 Rather than beg the public to take heed of changing political contexts, Shelburne 
and Groves examined budgetary reports and financial estimates to inform readers of the U.S. 
military’s bankroll. At the time of its publication, Education in the Armed Forces noted that half 
of every tax dollar paid was allotted to the military budget, with more than $50 billion intended 
purely for education and training.27 While paying tribute to the United States’ continued role as a 
global leader in military advancement, Shelburne and Groves nonetheless warned against the 
reality of inter-service redundancy and “costly training and education facilities.”28 The military 
juggernaut was producing soldiers and technology at peak efficiency, but at what cost? 
One notable aspect of this work, however, is that it provides one of the few early 
examinations into the ideological justifications present in military curricula. Shelburne and 
Groves examined the Armed Forces Information and Education program, which was 
occasionally called “why-we-fight” instruction.29 Perhaps inspired by the historiographical turn 
towards social history that developed in the 1960s, Education in the Armed Forces was an early 
instance of probing how the personal opinions of ordinary soldiers were shaped during their 
training. With classes touching on national American goals, international affairs, and the nature 
and purpose of Communism,30 each trainee was shown to have a significant amount of time 
dedicated towards forming an image of what role they played on a global stage. The faceless 
soldiers of Lyons, Masland, and Radwar now had personal goals, aspirations, and justifications 
for their enlistment. Though in a brief and early form, Shelburne and Groves’ economic 
exploration of military education actually hinted toward greater examination of social and 
cultural aspects of military life and training, something which would not fully come to fruition 
for some time. This, however, was side-tracked by the emerging crisis in Vietnam. 
Phase Three: An Issue of Identity [1970s] 
As the United States became entangled in the ideological and military quagmire in 
Southeast Asia, domestic critics voiced their opposition to involvement in foreign conflicts. The 
                                                          
26 James C. Shelburne and Kenneth J. Groves, Education in the Armed Forces (New York: The Center for Applied 
Research in Education, Inc., 1965), vii. 
27 Shelburne and Groves, Education in the Armed Forces, 2. 
28 Shelburne and Groves, Education in the Armed Forces, 107. 
29 Shelburne and Groves, Education in the Armed Forces, 43. 
30 Shelburne and Groves, Education in the Armed Forces, 43. 
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Pentagon and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were forced to re-examine their approach to the changing 
military and political contexts of a world in which a superpower had been defeated. The 1970s 
represented a period of reflexive examination not only for the American military, but the Cold 
War at large. The domino theory of communist expansion as well as Robert McNamara’s zero-
sum body-count approach to war had both been brought into question. Though initially proffered 
by Nikita Khrushchev to Eisenhower in the 1950s,31 a détente between President Richard Nixon 
and General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev represented a thaw in global tensions. Classified as 
razriadka (Pазрядка) in Russian, détente was a low point of aggression through which the 
United States and USSR saw increased levels of cultural exchange, communication, and mutual 
understanding.32 This was not a permanent relationship, but it nonetheless brought the climactic 
dichotomy between superpowers into question - as well as the large military establishments 
meant to enforce it. In light of this new line of examination, and in failing to prevent the socialist 
unification of Vietnam, the Department of Defense and its training organizations were drawn 
into ongoing public disputes, and by extension, newly shaped academic inquiry.  
 As a case study of the United States Military Academy at West Point, School for 
Soldiers: West Point and the Profession of Arms began with an ostensibly benign research 
question: “how does West Point train the nation’s future military leaders?”33 Underneath this 
inquiry, however, authors Joseph Ellis and Robert Moore unearthed a near “schizophrenic” issue 
of identity within the academy.34 Unlike previous historians such as Lyons, who glorified a 
merger of civilian and military life, Ellis and Moore highlighted the problematic aspects of 
integrating dual systems of ideals. In attempting to be “both Athens and Sparta,”35 West Point 
embodied contrary ideals of inclusivity and insularity. With the knowledge that post-war 
contexts have increasingly placed military men and women in the “bureaucracy” rather than the 
“battlefield,”36 West Point faced issues of producing officers capable of surviving in the business 
and professional communities just as well as in the jungles of Southeast Asia. The faculty all 
agreed that the military academy should provide “something called general education, but they 
                                                          
31 Erik P. Hoffmann, et al., Soviet Foreign Policy (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1991), 750. 
32 Belmonte, Selling the American War, 69. 
33 Joseph Ellis and Robert Moore, School for Soldiers: West Point and the Profession of Arms (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1974), vi. 
34 Ellis and Moore, School for Soldiers, 30. 
35 Ellis and Moore, School for Soldiers, 30. 
36 Ellis and Moore, School for Soldiers, 194. 
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disagree over what that term means.”37 The end result was a split mentality, where some 
department heads advocated for progressive and “sophisticated electives,” while others pushed 
for “withdrawal, consolidation, and retrenchment.”38 If nothing else, Ellis and Moore put forth an 
argument on the post-war difficulties of merging civilian and military ideals of the typical 
soldier, a new understanding within the field of Armed Forces education. The graduates of 
military life were now beginning to be seen and analyzed for their individuality and life after 
service. 
Phase Four: Indoctrination as Pedagogy [1980s] 
As Soviet T-62 tanks rumbled through the Afghan towns of Kushka and Termez in 
December of 1979, détente fell by the wayside as a failed episode of mutual understanding. 
Signalling an unsuccessful reconciliation between Leonid Brezhnev and both Jimmy Carter and 
Ronald Reagan, the Cold War ‘thaw’ had reached its end in the 1980s as America took on a 
more aggressive form of foreign policy.39 Just as political arenas ignited with debate on shifting 
world issues, so too did the historical field look inwards and reflect on its own assumptions. Cold 
War and Soviet historiography at this time was still struggling with the ramifications of 
revisionist and post-revisionist debates, arguing over the complicity or agency of Soviet peoples 
in a vast teleological Marxist process.40 Similarly, debates within the field of military and 
education history created one of the most influential and relevant monographs of the 1980s, 
stemming from an interdisciplinary conference at the University of Chicago in 1981. In a 
surprising contrast with Cold War historiography – which at this point was moving away from 
concepts of overarching, controlling ideology41 – scholars of American military education were 
just now beginning to examine indoctrination as a meaningful influence in Cold War contexts. 
                                                          
37 Ellis and Moore, School for Soldiers, 58. 
38 Ellis and Moore, School for Soldiers, 60 and 220. 
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Thirty-five social scientists convened and set out to explore the “issues and problems 
dealing with indoctrination and civic education in the military.”42 The fruits of this conference 
emerged two years later in the monograph collection of essays entitled The Political Education 
of Soldiers. By examining the training of multiple military services – ranging from the Israeli, 
British, and American to the Vietcong and Soviet Armed Forces – the investigators sought to 
judge the efficacy and combat effectiveness of strong ideological and political curricula. 
Importantly, this revolved around the concept of indoctrination and the process of “fashioning 
attitudes and behaviour […] by emphasizing a preconceived – and unified – symbolic content.”43 
Based on this understanding of military training, the combined authors argued that despite the 
“manipulative” and even “illogical” content of indoctrination, it has been demonstrated to 
dramatically improve combat effectiveness.44 “The inescapable fact,” Stephen D. Wesbrook 
claimed, “is that no fully developed communist army has ever disintegrated in battle.”45 In 
creating good communist soldiers instead of simply good soldiers, a system of “coercion and 
persuasion” in fact limited the military’s “vulnerability to physical and psychological collapse as 
long as the party remains intact.”46 In essence, the work came to the conclusion that there were 
significant benefits to be derived from socio-political and civic training throughout the armed 
forces of any nation.  Adamantly, the authors ended their work with a condemnation of the US 
Army’s neglect of this subject stating that the military could not “continue to ignore the 
significance of socio-political factors” and “expect success in battle.”47 Just as civilian and 
military relations were promoted in the 1950s, The Political Education of Soldiers looked to 
endorse a coercive type of educational indoctrination to facilitate combat effectiveness.  
 First and foremost, at least in the academic community, this work brought the issue of 
mentality and soldier psychology to the vanguard of military education. Published a scant three 
years after the Iranian hostage crises, and as the United States still struggled with the memory of 
failure in Vietnam a decade earlier, The Political Education of Soldiers offered a defensible 
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reason for a perceived decline in American military prowess. The virtues and ideals of 
democracy were not at fault in the struggle against socialism and communism, but rather they 
were not being properly imposed on the minds of those on the ideological and physical front 
lines. Indoctrination theory brought individual men and women to equal footing with the stressed 
American importance of tactics, technology, and strategy.48 This became one of the explanations 
as to why a technologically superior force was required to evacuate in the face of a smaller and 
less conventional military, such as the Viet Cong. A widespread and systemic fault had been 
found in the American military education system; and it was one that could not be solved by 
small variations in academic syllabi. For the first time – in American military historiography, at 
least – the concept of a soldier’s belief (or lack thereof) was purported to be a fundamental 
aspect of combat effectiveness. In order to win wars, nations had to imprint systems of belief into 
their enlisted soldiers and officers. 
 Indirectly, this same argument created a harsher distinction between Soviet and non-
Soviet value systems. If a military succeeded or failed based on its faith in an ideological 
structure, any groups that did not adhere to an identical structure were thus categorized as the 
‘other.’ The monograph demonstrated this same type of thinking, as the authors subconsciously 
narrated the aspects of indoctrination in terms of ‘the West’ and ‘the Soviet bloc.’ Portrayals of 
communist soldiers, in the form of both Vietnamese and Soviet troops, were transformed from 
ominous and unknown external threats into very real individuals coerced into being dogmatic 
believers. By extension, the Soviet Union itself was more readily evaluated than in previous 
monographs. The Soviets were portrayed as naturally inclined toward “distortion and half-truth” 
indoctrination methods.49 The organizational structure of the Soviet government allowed for 
complete civilian control of the military, something which was argued to not occur “in states 
using the liberal or democratic model.”50 They relied on Vospitanie (upbringing / Воспитание), 
Obuchenie (training / Обучение) and Obrazovanie (education / Образованиe) to make 
supposedly unquestioning Marxist-Leninist zealots.51 The ominous external threats of the 1950s 
thus took the shape of militant defenders of the Soviet Union, standing guard against threats from 
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the capitalist world. In a notable example of subject and analyst exemplifying similar modes of 
thinking, both the military educational institutes and the historians who studied them began to 
form a skewed perception of the USSR and its representative soldiers. As one of the first 
historical works to bring up a discussion of ideology and indoctrination, The Political Education 
of Soldiers also acted as a prime example of a confluence between military and propaganda 
studies. This tack would soon be taken up by succeeding scholars, albeit with a much more self-
reflexive mentality. 
 One tangential comment must be made concerning the 1988 publication of Soviet 
Military Power: The Pentagon’s Propaganda Document, Annotated and Corrected, by Tom 
Gervasi. Though it does not fit easily into this trend of indoctrination study, Gervasi’s 
monograph reflects an attempt at analyzing government-produced instructional products on the 
Soviet military. Throughout the 1980s, the Department of Defense published an annual report 
entitled Soviet Military Power.52 This work was self-described as an unclassified report on the 
USSR’s military developments created in an effort to inform “the Free World” and give them the 
necessary information to “appreciate the tremendous size and scope of the security challenges 
before us.”53 Gervasi, in response, viewed the publication as possessing offensive levels of 
misrepresentations and even outright lies, which he sought to correct in his lengthy annotated re-
printing of the DoD work.54 Despite being a longstanding member of the intelligence 
community, and a prolific publisher for organizations like Harper’s and the Columbia 
Journalism Review, military critics found his corrections to be largely inconsequential, while 
simultaneously arguing for an extensively malicious deception on the part of the United States 
government as it sought to portray the Soviets as supremely powerful. Lieutenant Commander 
John A. Roberts, for instance, took Gervasi to task in his graduating thesis at Fort Leavenworth. 
In over 70 pages of meticulous and well-reasoned argument, Roberts posited that while Soviet 
Military Power understandably had its weaknesses, Gervasi’s critique was predominantly trivial, 
overly sarcastic, and ultimately deceptive in order to pursue his own political agendas. Simply 
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put, Roberts argued that Gervasi not only misinterpreted the purpose of Soviet Military Power, 
but also did not successfully provide evidence for his claim that it was an intentionally deceptive 
piece of propaganda.55 
 While this spat over technicalities did not largely affect the historiographic trend, it 
remains quite relevant to this investigation into American training manuals. If Soviet Military 
Power demonstrated a certain portrayal of the Soviet Union and its military branches, it is worth 
including as a publically disseminated version of our training doctrine. On the other hand, 
although Gervasi’s contribution to the field is a needed and valuable attempt to question 
government publications, it ultimately becomes muddled in the details and inconsistencies rather 
than overarching themes. For the purposes of this investigation, we can sidestep Gervasi and 
Roberts’ focus on the minutia of Soviet Military Power, and use it to lend credence and context 
to other aspects of this investigation. Gervasi’s work can then be seen as a venture outside the 
purview and scope into military training specifically, and instead one of validity and technical 
veracity. A discussion into whether the Sukhoi Su-24 ‘Fencer’ bomber had a range of 1300km or 
1500km simply is not relevant when concepts of representation, identity, and Cold War national 
image disputes.56  
Phase Five: Partial Opening of the Soviet Archives, 
 Widening Interpretations [1991-2000] 
 Ultimately, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of the Russian Federation in 
1991 did not reflect the culmination of a generation-long Cold War, but rather an internal revolt 
and disruption from which the vast political union could not recover. As Boris Yeltsin, through 
brilliant political strategy and timely power plays, became the first elected president of Russia,57 
the United States seemed at first to lose a fundamental component of its understanding of the 
global political system. With the supposed antagonism deflated, American scholars surged into 
the Russian archives in search of primary source material with which to challenge previous 
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assumptions of Sovietology and Cold War relations.58 Paradoxically, a similar enthusiasm has 
not been demonstrated by the analysts of American military education. After nearly 46 years of 
framing instruction in opposition to Soviet forces, the collapse of the USSR appears to have 
forced historians to marginalize the communist role in enlisted training. Instead, the fruits of 
cultural and social movements in history allowed for a broader analytical framework within 
which to view the educational aspects of martial life. Paramount among these was a closer 
examination of the interactions between war (and by extension, the military) and society, a topic 
only briefly explored in earlier phases. 
 The best representation of this trend is Michael S. Neiberg’s Making Citizen-Soldiers: 
ROTC and the Ideology of American Military Service (2000). Returning to the subject of 
campus-embedded officer programs, Neiberg greatly differentiated himself from the works of 
Masland or Lyons. Making Citizen-Soldiers established itself as a work on war and society rather 
than pure military history or top-down political analysis. Neiberg was intently focused on the 
“nature of American attitudes toward the military,” and ongoing reforms present within the 
ROTC.59 Through his nuanced exploration, Neiberg argued that a Moderate Whig ideology 
influenced public understanding of the ROTC.60 This allowed the program to exist in a space 
between stark opposition to standing professional armies (in Radical Whig fashion), and the 
alternative complete surrender to civilian oversight. Initially, the attempted infusion of liberal 
and non-elite campus students was met with some measure of resistance on the parts of both 
educational institutes and the Armed Forces. Yet, despite these difficulties in reconciling military 
and civilian life, universities still widely supported the ROTC program over time regardless of its 
contemporary incarnation and political leanings.61 In this valuable social history of the ROTC’s 
interaction with academic institutes, Neiberg demonstrated that there was a significant number of 
theoretical lenses which authors like Lyons and Masland did not utilize when examining military 
education. 
 Various motifs were touched on which would be familiar to current readers of historical 
scholarship. Collective memory and public perception were paramount in Neiberg’s analysis of 
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the ongoing relationship between higher education and the ROTC programs. Issues of American 
identity and nationalism were utilized to explain why this first inroad to a reciprocal relationship 
between the Department of Defense and the American public was so problematic and fraught 
with difficulty, as the United States grappled with the seemingly contrary values of democracy 
and traditionalist militarism.62 The military-industrial complex finally emerged as a topic worthy 
of inquiry forty years after Eisenhower’s distressing warning.63 All told, Making Citizen-Soldiers 
acted as the most comprehensive and well-formed theoretical approach to military educational 
history to date. 
Conversely, in whole-heartedly following the path of social and cultural history, an 
integral part of military education has seemingly been relegated to Cold War periodization. 
Neiberg had no inclination towards including commentary on the opponents of ROTC training. 
This introspective into American identity and military-civilian relationships marginalized the 
possibly skewed and powerful representation of Soviet forces, and by extension, Soviet 
existence. While not the stated objective of the work, an opportunity may have been missed in 
not exploring the issues of American identity when contrasted against those of the USSR. After 
all, if Cold War events influenced the ROTC’s perception, would that not necessitate an 
examination of the rhetoric understood to pit the democratic United States against the expanding 
communist USSR? As post-war America imagined itself as one half of a global struggle of super 
powers, any examination of Cold War military training seems inadequate without at least 
tangentially addressing this point. Similarly, in attempting to move forward from the Cold War 
as a lens of analysis, authors like Neiberg unfortunately ignore drastic changes in Soviet 
leadership – such as Mikhail Gorbachev’s initiatives of Glasnost, perestroika, and amiable 
foreign policies with the Western world64 – and how they affected the development of the 
American military in the closing years of the ideological conflict. Evidently, the most recent 
incarnations within the field of American military education have been found wanting, and the 
subject’s theoretical and methodological frameworks are demonstrably inadequate. 
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Phase Six: Filling Gaps [2000-2017] 
 Great strides have been made in Cold War historiography since the partial opening of 
the Soviet archives, with historians benefiting not only from improved access to primary sources 
but the development and inclusion of interdisciplinary theoretical approaches. The Cold War 
itself has been examined and re-examined as a historical framework, and the field is currently 
argued to have never been more varied in its “methods and concerns.”65 Publications are 
continuously released which portray American-Soviet relations in surprisingly fresh ways, 
constantly finding new positions with which to mine the Cold War epoch and relate them to 
modern contexts. Laura A. Belmonte’s Selling the American Way: U.S. Propaganda and the 
Cold War (2010), for instance, finds a confluence between military and cultural history by 
examining the inherent contradictions in America’s public diplomacy programs, something 
which the nation still struggles with today. In another example, Chalmers Johnson’s The Sorrows 
of Empire tracks the complex dynamics between a new form of US imperialism fostered by the 
creation of a comprehensive network of military bases across the globe.66 By drawing parallels 
between the transitioning republics of Rome and the United States, Johnson attempts to hang the 
imperial purple on a newly fashioned American form of empire. 
However, the same forms of inventiveness and scholarly creativity are not being applied 
to the field of military education. Entire topics, motifs, and theoretical questions have remained 
untouched by investigators within the field. Unlike their counterparts in other academic 
specialities, authors studying military education have left powerful frameworks alone in pursuit 
of pure military analysis. For instance, race is absent despite a long history of scholarship on the 
Cold War’s impact on American racial tensions.67 Gender within the military is also relegated to 
a position of irrelevancy. The study of nationalism, which has undergone significant progress in 
the previous few decades, is only tangentially posited as a reason for ideological loyalty, rather 
                                                          
65 Joel Isaac and Duncan Bell, “Introduction,” in Uncertain Empire: American History and the Idea of the Cold War, 
eds. Joel Isaac and Duncan Bell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 4. 
66 Chalmers Johnson, The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic (London: Verso, 
2004); A similar theme has been pursued more recently in Catherine Lutz, ed., The Bases of Empire: The Global 
Struggle against U.S. Military Posts (New York: New York University Press, 2009). 
67 Of particular note is Penny Von Eschen, who follows the unique lives of musicians such as Dizzy Gillespie or 
Louis Armstrong as they are used to spread American ideals internationally while being subject to segregation and 
inequality domestically. See Penny Von Eschen, Satchmo Blows Up The World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold 
War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006).  
R i c e  | 19 
than as a possible framework for the conflict as a whole.68 While these perspectives could be 
argued to have drastic implications for both our historical understanding and the modern realities 
of the American soldier, there is an unexpected dearth of explorative scholarship within the field. 
United States Armed Forces education history exists in a theoretical bubble, isolating it not only 
from current historiographic trends, but those preceding them as well. Ideological tensions 
between America and Tsarist Russia, for example, predate the Cold War conflict by nearly half a 
century – something which military education historiography has failed to highlight, despite 
correlations between Eastern and Western divides on nineteenth century modernization theory 
and twentieth century democracy.69 Most pertinent to this work, however, is the surprising 
absence of the Soviet soldier. 
In 1991, the United States Congress passed the Defense Appropriations Act which 
included $10 million dollars for the formation of an archival program to “inventory, protect and 
conserve the physical and literary property of the Cold War so that future generations could 
understand and appreciate its meaning and significance.”70 The Cold War had apparently come 
and gone, and historians of military education seemed to have taken that message to heart. Yet 
on March 12, 2015, Admiral William E. Gortney of the United States Navy warned the Senate 
Armed Services Committee of an increased Russian “military assertiveness”71 and expanding 
nuclear capabilities – a commentary which seems more fitting in the 1980s, and such a 
perception has only increased based on continued Russian expansion in Eastern Europe and 
alleged influence in current American politics. In pursuit of commenting on non-linear combat 
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put into favour by modern counter-insurgency training,72 scholars of the War Colleges have left 
some meaningful Cold War sources, and their modern ramifications, relatively untouched. 
Current historiography is still attempting to reconcile the ‘past’ conflict with its modern 
ramifications – counteracting what is described as a generation that has “grown accustomed to 
dangerous denial” on the Cold War’s true impacts.73 Other fields within the social sciences 
continuously find ways of explaining modern Russian-American relations and global 
interventionism through their possible origins in Cold War contexts.74 It seems only fitting that 
analysts of military education attempt to follow suit. Yet, unless used as an ideological foil or as 
a referenced shadowy opponent, historiography has made no attempt to analyze America’s 
faithful ground-level opponent. 
In an effort to fill in one of these academic gaps, this investigation seeks to extract and 
analyze the changing representation of the Soviet soldier within American military education 
systems. Despite being significantly represented within the primary source materials, scholars 
have made no attempt to critically examine how the members of the Soviet armed forces were 
depicted within Cold War contexts. The skewed and falsified myth of the Soviet soldier in 
American military training has consequently been neglected by the academic community. This 
fictional distortion of the average Soviet combatant reflects a long history of America’s attempts 
to grapple with its post-war role as a global leader, the emphasized dichotomy between 
democracy and communism, as well as the social and cultural ramifications of creating soldiers 
in service of these struggles. Just how pervasive was propaganda in the final decades of Cold 
War military education? How did that contrast with previous incarnations of the “Red Menace”? 
In what ways have those representations influenced current Russian-American relations? Is there 
a persistent Soviet myth perpetuated by military institutions? In answering these question and 
more, the following work aims not only to demonstrate a pervasive constructed myth of the 
Soviet soldier, but also to extrapolate that representation’s modern ramifications. As Cold War 
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rhetoric has resurfaced in the wake of Russian involvements in Georgia, Crimea, Ukraine, and 
Syria, there are ample opportunities to dissect the conflict’s continuing influence. Examining the 
myth of the Soviet soldier is perhaps just one step toward fulfilling that goal. 
Section 2 – Military Training Manuals as Sources 
In order to pick apart the experience of American recruits during their military education 
(hypothetical or otherwise), this analysis uses a selection of training manuals released throughout 
the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s. The publishing agencies behind these works were intelligence 
and military organizations such as the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), 
the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the Soviet Studies Office/Foreign Military Studies 
Office (SSO/FMSO), which each provided its own style, format, and perspective of the Soviet 
soldier. Attached are some selected covers from my self-made source library; the examples 
include Figure 1 which shows FM 100-2-1 The Soviet Army: Operations and Tactics, released in 
1984 (and subsequently updated in 1991), as well as 1989’s PAM 550-95 Soviet Union: A 
Country Study. While the majority of these works were released - and related to - the Department 
of the Army (DA), for the purposes of this examination’s scope we can assume that the evidence 
displayed here reflects similar treatment within the larger Department of Defense umbrella. 
Combined, these manuals represent thousands of pages of what the military considered to be the 
“definitive source of unclassified information” on Soviet forces at the time.75 To examine them is 
to take a look through the perspective of American military analysts, publishers, and students 
during the twilight years of the Cold War. But to keep a handle on the various acronyms, 
numerical codes, and similarly-named titles attached to these manuals, let us examine one in 
particular so it can act as a representative for the remainder. 
 The starting point for this thesis was my discovery of FM 100-2-3 The Soviet Army: 
Troops, Organization, and Equipment.76 FM 100-2-3 was the final piece of a field manual 
tripartite which included the previously mentioned FM 100-2-1 and FM 100-2-2 The Soviet 
Army: Specialized Warfare and Rear Area Support.77 Found in a second hand bookstore, FM 
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100-2-3 was published in Washington, DC, but its main proponent was HQ TRADOC in Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas, the home of multiple US Army establishments. As we can see from 
Figure 2, which gives a sample of its contents, the manual has over 400 pages of lists, 
descriptions, and theory on the skills and operations of the Soviet military. From the descriptions 
of conscription and pre-military/paramilitary training in chapter three to the meticulous analysis 
of equipment in chapter five, each page provides something of value to the interested reader. FM 
100-2-3 epitomizes the kinds of analyzed sources whose primary goals were teaching students 
about the technology and abilities of the USSR. Hidden amid esoteric charts and weapon 
specifics is a subtle formation about what and who the Soviet soldier truly was. Field manuals 
such as FM 100-2-3 and FM 100-2-1 would be updated every few years as information and 
knowledge developed. For our purposes, selections from both the 1984 and 1991 generation of 
publications will be used. Other such manuals which follow a similar format of overt 
technological and operational discussion with hidden commentaries are the 133 page DDI-1100-
77-76 The Soviet Motorized Rifle Company (1976) and the 442 page PAM 350-14 Heavy 
Opposing Force (OPFOR) Operation Art Handbook (1994).78  
 Another grouping of primary sources speaks more directly about Soviet character, 
mentality, and ideology. Simply put, the manuals in this category are much more text heavy and 
impart blunt descriptions of the Soviet soldier directly. Examples include the 507 page FM 30-
102 Opposing Forces Europe (1977) and the 1132 page PAM 550-95 Soviet Union: A Country 
Study (1989). A Country Study is particularly noteworthy, for it was compiled by a 
“multidisciplinary team of social scientists” adhering to “accepted standards of scholarly 
objectivity,” whatever that means.79 While it claims to not represent official US policy, an earlier 
pamphlet (PAM 550-55 Area Handbook for South Vietnam) stated that the series purpose was to 
be “useful to military […] personnel who need a convenient compilation of basic facts about the 
social, economic, political and military institutions and practices of various countries.”80 As 
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such, it covered numerous political, cultural, and economic motifs in an attempt to explain a 
nation to typical military personnel, and thus presented a much more complicated and in-depth 
analysis than works from the previous grouping.  
 While this separation into two categories helps to differentiate the sources, it must be 
remembered that all of the above works – and those yet to be mentioned – share attributes of 
both groupings. This is simply a helpful method of understanding the collection as a whole. I did 
consult other publications for my research – ones that do not easily fit into the categories denoted 
above since they are shorter and generally written by a solitary author. Therefore, they speak less 
to an overarching policy and interpretation by the DoD as a whole, and more to the views of the 
individual. This selection of works is best exemplified by publications like the 40 page report 
Soviet Non-Linear Combat (1990) by Lieutenant Colonel Lester W. Grau, and the 9 page article 
entitled A Commander’s Guide to the Soviet Forward Detachment by Major James F. 
Holcomb.81 Despite being shorter and less authoritative, I found these pieces nonetheless helped 
to flesh out a general perception of the Soviet soldier that circulated during the later decades of 
the Cold War. 
 Lastly some tertiary sources, such as Soviet Military Power by the Department of 
Defense and the Annual Report to the Congress by Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, 
shall be used to provide contextual information and another frame of reference within which to 
couch the purely military publications.82 Both series of works were written with the express 
purpose of informing the public and government, respectively, on the balance of power between 
the United States and the USSR.  Although they fall outside the scope of an internalized, military 
understanding of the Soviets, they are still useful in noting some commonalities between the 
narratives framed for public consumption and those produced for internal military instruction and 
education. 
 The challenge then becomes taking this spontaneously collected home archive and 
examining a relatively unmined repository of historical information. Cold War civilian 
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propaganda and military jingoism played a large role in American history – both on the part of 
lived experience and in scholarly analysis. When supplemented by a wealth of secondary sources 
of Cold War culture and propaganda, my research into the content of the U.S. military 
educational system answers some questions about the ways in which civilian and service spheres 
diverge. In order to do so, let us turn toward the popular culture basis which we must traverse to 
gain a complex and multifaceted understanding of the Soviet Other. 
Section 3 – Antagonistic Culture versus Military Positivity 
 In the final scenes of 1984’s Red Dawn, two American freedom fighters make a last 
desperate attack against a combined occupying force of Russian and Cuban communist 
invaders.83 With little hope of survival, the two brothers engage in a suicidal attempt on the 
Soviet encampment so that their allies can escape into the great inner plains – dubbed “Free 
America.” The film’s main antagonist, Russian General Bratchenko (Vladek Sheybal), follows a 
red blood trail in the white snow, chasing the brothers, before ending up in a standoff with the 
older Jed Eckert, played by Patrick Swayze. In a standoff reminiscent of spaghetti westerns, Jed 
and Bratchenko exchange gunfire before the Russian falls to the American’s old-fashioned six-
shooter. As he carries his wounded brother to safety, Jed comes upon Cuban Colonel Ernesto 
Bella, who mercifully puts down his rifle to let the brothers escape. With Bratchenko dead, 
Colonel Bella looks down in disgust at his hands and receives a form of redemption which his 
deceased Russian commander never could. The film ends with a final narrative of the monument 
dedicated to the fallen Wolverines – invoking Lincoln’s Gettysburg address to commemorate 
those who perished “so that this nation […] should not perish from the Earth.”84 
While it would may be presumptuous to highlight Red Dawn as a prime example of 
Russian – and by extension Soviet – representation, it is symbolic of a larger American zeitgeist 
which presented the USSR as a foreign entity that stood in direct opposition to the very existence 
of the United States. Through the highs and lows of Cold War tensions, there has been a 
consistent trend within both the civilian and government portrayal of the Soviet opponent; the 
enemy is depicted as inscrutable, domineering, and ominously threatening. In what is perhaps a 
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self-fulling prophecy, the dichotomy between East and West became a familiar trope and 
motivating tactic.  
Before there was Red Dawn, however, there was a half century of both physical and 
theoretical line drawing in which a vast Cold War framework was formed. Perhaps best 
embodied within – and catalyzed by – the 1950s rhetoric of United States Senator Joseph 
McCarthy, American propaganda has led a lengthy and antagonistic path throughout Cold War 
history. Stemming from tensions between the Eastern and Western Blocs, the Soviet Union’s 
Warsaw Pact and the United States of America’s North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 
respectively, entire institutions were founded in order to shape and subvert cultural perceptions 
of the so-called ‘menace’ originating from behind the Iron Curtain.85 The enemy was branded as 
“Socialists”, “Communists”, “Bolsheviks”, “Reds”, “Ruskies”, “Pinkos”, and everything in-
between. This foreign (or internal, depending on your perspective) influence on the lives of the 
American people ebbed and flowed with the shifting global political tides. To date, numerous 
historians have spent their entire careers investigating American-Soviet relations during this 
period. Others such as David S. Foglesong have also impressively demonstrated that this 
mercurial positioning can trace its roots back long before George F. Kennan posited the idea of 
communist containment in 1947. The tenuous relationship between the two powers would only 
be exacerbated by a continuous rise and fall of each respective nation’s prosperity, often times at 
odds with the other; America’s decadence of the 1920s was seemingly balanced by the Russian 
famine of the early 1920s, with the situation reversing itself during Wall Street crash of 1929 and 
the Great Depression that followed, since these contrasted with the newly-industrialized and 
recovering Soviet Union.86 The cataclysm of the Second World War only dragged this tension 
even further into the light, as disagreements over fronts, invasions, and occupied territory led 
President Harry Truman to state in April 1945 that the Russians “don’t know how to behave. 
They are like bulls in a china shop. They are only 25 years old. […] We have got to teach them 
how to behave.”87 This antagonistic relationship continued for the remainder of the twentieth 
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century, becoming embodied in almost every aspect of American culture: from film to comic 
books, marketing ads to political campaigns. The battle for hearts and minds took place on an 
imaginary playing field – one couched in the somewhat ephemeral language of identity, 
perception, and representation. 
 While one must always be careful to generalize about an entire society’s mentality 
through only a select few works of popular culture, there is still some value in highlighting what 
items bubbled to the surface amidst Cold War era fears of communism. In the same year that saw 
the release of The Pearl and A Streetcar Named Desire, works such as Is This Tomorrow: 
America Under Communism (1947) showed a vision of the United States engulfed in flames; it 
sought to render readers “more alert to the menace of Communism.”88 1960’s To Kill a 
Mockingbird and Green Eggs and Ham was accompanied by The Red Iceberg, which similarly 
warned against the impending unforeseen dangers of an oncoming and unshakeable Soviet 
Union.89 Robert Conquest and Jon White’s instructional What to Do When the Russians Come 
(1984) was followed up with a beguiling Neuromancer and the stirring The Unbearable 
Lightness of Being.90 Unarguably the American national consciousness, spreading Soviet 
influence abroad, and the uncertainty of a world on the brink of conflict influenced creative 
mediums in all their forms.  
Marketing advertisements were also similarly active within this cultural battlefield, as 
American businesses took many opportunities to strike at the threating Soviets and their 
perceived hatred for capitalism even as they hawked the most mundane of products to the public. 
The caption of a poster for the Bohn Aluminum and Brass Corporation reads, “It looked safe, but 
it was deadly poison. A dose of socialism can be just as deadly. It kills freedom… Leads to 
Communism. Would you risk a little POISON?”91 A second example hawks with Scot Tissue 
Towels. The main blurb at the bottom states that “wiping your hands on harsh, cheap paper 
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towels” would make you grumble and complain too, perhaps fomenting capitalist antipathy and 
encouraging communist thoughts.92 Almost any event could be skewed into a negative spotlight.  
Even the world expo in Montreal was portrayed as allowing for Soviet construction rather too 
close to the United States border.93 Finally, to conclude my limited sample, advertising 
concerned Americans were guided into purchasing ‘Truth Dollars.’ These would support Radio 
Free Europe, which broadcast messages of freedom across the Iron Curtain.94 The market was as 
much a battlefield for Cold War identity as the wide landscape of entertainment products. 
These local anti-Communist sentiments were also supplemented by campaigns abroad 
that often received official American government sponsorship. Founded in 1953, the United 
States Information Agency saw itself as performing public diplomacy throughout the world in 
the pursuit of sharing American virtues of freedom with other nations in order to hinder 
communism’s spread. The USIA’s battle was one of public image as well as diplomacy. Selling 
the United States narrative, way of life, and humanitarian image was another means of taking a 
national story and transposing it onto the transnational world. One of the most interesting 
examples of this was their attempt to use musicians as ambassadors of US life and culture 
abroad. Believing that the improvised and flowing nature of jazz embodied America’s freedom 
of thought and that it could act as a symbolic counter to Soviet structure and totalitarianism, the 
Information Agency repeatedly sent trumpeter Louis Armstrong to perform across Europe and 
Africa.95 On the one hand, this type of cultural exchange opened up some avenues for American 
diplomacy in beleaguered third world nations trying to navigate the between superpowers. On 
the other, Soviet authors were quick to highlight the hypocrisy of sending a man out to promote 
freedom when he returned home to a segregated nation. Public image, perception, and 
representation became an international priority for the United States. 
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Inevitably, the promotion of the Self would have best been supported by the detraction of 
the Other – the Soviets. While this occurred both officially and unofficially throughout the 
second half of the twentieth century, the best example comes during the chaos surrounding the 
1979 Soviet incursion into Afghanistan. Throughout that year, the Afghanistan government faced 
armed revolt roughly based on their domineering attempts to quickly modernize and centralize 
the country. The Soviet Union was called on to provide military support to the current 
government and repress a rebellious group of mujahedeen based on prior Afghan-Soviet treaties. 
At the time, the United States saw this as an opportunity to draw the USSR into a political and 
military quagmire.96 Advisors within the Carter administration promoted the idea of “giving to 
the USSR its Vietnam war.”97 With funding and military aid from NATO countries, the 
propaganda shifted towards rebel fighters painted in a traditional Islamic light, fighting to stem 
the red tide from reaching their country. The conflict was portrayed in an extremely negative 
light, and has since been referred to as an invasion rather than a violent repression. At the time of 
the incursion, the now infamous Osama Bin Laden was praised by British paper The Independent 
as a “Saudi businessman” who recruited mujahedin and “put his army on the road to peace.”98 
This type of anti-Soviet sentiment led to a limited movement to boycott the 1980 Moscow 
Olympics. Dispersing the proper American image throughout the world was just as important as 
maintaining military bases and defense treaties. Questioning the Soviet identity became as vital 
as funding anti-Communist factions in Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East.  
Of course, it goes without saying that this reductive anti-Soviet rhetoric did not go 
unnoticed or uncriticised by the American people. In politics, both the left and right found 
reasons to support or decry the so-called Communist threat. The general population could be 
thought of as having a similarly diverse perspective. Yet the commonality of Soviet agents, 
oppressive mentalities, and unknown threats from beyond still took hold and remained a 
dominant motif of late twentieth century popular culture in the Western world. In the United 
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States specifically, we can return to perhaps the most overt and accessible forms of this tension 
embodied through films like Red Dawn. In the early years of the Cold War, The Red Menace 
(1949) followed two once-dedicated American communists before they realized the true, evil 
nature of the political group before attempting to quit the party.99 Three years later, John Wayne 
veered away from his iconic roles in Wild West to instead play a HUAC investigator tracking 
down communists in 1952’s Big Jim McLain.100 As author Patricia Bosworth notes, over fifty 
anti-Communist films were produced “very quickly between 1949 and 1954,”101 and these would 
also be followed by works that would disguise their themes through the trappings of science 
fiction, such as 1953’s It Came From Outer Space.102 1952’s Invasion, U.S.A., had the United 
States besieged by a force known only as ‘The Enemy,’ heavily implied to be the Soviet 
Union.103 Of course this should not be confused with 1985’s Invasion U.S.A., when Matt Hunter 
(played by Chuck Norris) fended off a Soviet-led incursion on the Florida coastline.104 Though 
the 1960s and 1970s saw a dip in direct anti-communist films amidst an emerging stream of anti-
war pictures such as Mickey Mouse in Vietnam (1969), The Deer Hunter (1978), and Apocalypse 
Now (1979), there were still occasional contributions to the fearful stream.105 Most notably was 
John Wayne reprising his anti-communist role as a soldier (and director) in The Green Berets 
(1968), the untrustworthy Boris Vaslov (Ernest Borgnine) in Ice Station Zebra (1968), and the 
manipulative Mrs. Iselin of The Manchurian Candidate (1962).106 Though suffering through a 
low point of Eastern European villains, the motif still endured this tumultuous period of debate 
within American culture. 
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In the 1980s, however, there was a resurgence of overtly anti-Soviet and anti-Communist 
films. Around the same period that this thesis’s manuals were being published, a slew of films 
were released which spoke toward the perceived binary between the United States and the 
USSR. Perhaps as a reaction to the end of détente and the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan, 
works like Firefox (1982), Red Dawn (1984), Rocky IV (1985), and No Way Out (1987) found 
themselves following in the tracks of their 1940s and 1950s predecessors.107 Others, like Rambo 
III (1988) and Red Scorpion (1988), utilized the context of Afghanistan to put more negative 
light on the Soviet forces.108 Not only do both of the films portray the local resistance as justified 
in fighting against an oppressive Soviet military invasion, Rambo III went so far as to dedicate 
the film to “the brave mujahideen fighters of Afghanistan.”109 The cultural battle for public 
perception was still occurring in earnest through the 1980s; and the medium of film was only the 
tip of the iceberg. Just as was occurring in Communist affiliated countries, the American cultural 
machine produced works that justified a narrative of justice and righteousness to any who would 
listen.  
Outside this battle for hearts and minds was also one of strategy and military dominance, 
as the U.S. Department of Defense attempted to quantify and document the martial capabilities 
of this abstract and culturally skewed rival. Over nearly half a century, organizations like the 
Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), 
and the Soviet Studies Office (SSO) have released a vast amount of training documents to help 
officers and soldiers alike better understand and defeat their Soviet counterparts.110 The question 
then becomes, however, whether these instructional manuals followed the same pattern that has 
historically been seen in American propaganda, cultural products, or public government releases. 
By examining manuals like FM 100-2-1 The Soviet Army: Operations and Tactics or FM 100-2-
3 The Soviet Army: Troops, Organization, and Equipment, readers can begin to pick apart just 
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how vast the divergence between civilian and military representation of the Soviet world truly 
was. By examining a piece of work from each generation of manuals (1984, 1991, and 1994), 
this investigation can lay a baseline understanding for the general portrayal and representation of 
the Soviet forces within the manuals. Once this baseline is achieved, I can then move on toward 
a closer examination of deeper trends in later sections. 
What would first strike our hypothetical soldier-in-training and any current readership is 
the language of respect and admiration that is diffused throughout the manuals, as it is so 
different from the cultural products of the same era that were just discussed. Initially, it may 
seem that this type of language only pertains to the combat capabilities and lethality of the Soviet 
ground forces. In the introductory pages of the 1984 version of FM 100-2-1, written at the height 
of Afghanistan incursion, military authors described the Soviet army as “highly modernized, well 
equipped,” possessing both the manpower and materiel to make them “a very formidable land 
army.”111 They continuously upgraded their material, allowing for more efficient fighting force 
with cuts away the necessity of a second echelon or mobile groups. As Secretary of Defense 
Weinberger put it, this was no longer the “ponderous Soviet Army of the past.”112 1991’s FM 
100-2-3 goes one step further, stating that the “unprecedented flexibility, mobility, and 
firepower” made the Soviet ground forces “the most powerful land army in the world.”113 Again, 
readers can note how the use of terms like “unprecedented” and “most powerful” could affect a 
new American military inductee. Even the 1994 PAM 350-16 Heavy Opposing Force Tactical 
Handbook, released years after the official dissolution of the USSR, touched on the FSU (Former 
Soviet Union, the basis for OPFOR) by continuing this trend of increasing respect and 
acknowledgement through the use of key adjectives and descriptors. An OPFOR commander 
would be “very conscious” of specific vulnerabilities such as an open flank during fire support 
missions,114 would be “keenly aware” of a dependence on communications,115 and would be able 
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to act “decisively and with initiative.”116 These few examples highlight the frequent 
complimentary terminology that was used in every manual in our sample. While the military 
force it portrayed is certainly idealized, this terminology nonetheless accounted for a certain 
amount of respect and admiration on the part of the American authors. Even if the language was 
truly neutral and aloof, which it most certainly was not, it was still wildly more diplomatic than 
the horror and fear promulgated in popular culture or in fear mongering government statements. 
Words like “decisive” and “keen” were used instead of “ominous” and “menacing.” These 
Soviets were not presented as monsters, but rather as formidable foes that one needed to respect. 
Those in charge of the rank and file – the officer corps – were also one of the most lauded 
subjects within the manuals. As the Soviet Union was described as having “the world’s most 
extensive network of military schools and reserve officer commissioning programs,”117 officers 
were referred to as “well-educated,” “well-trained,” and even though they have experienced a 
lifetime of political dogma, “they are not ignorant nor incapable of professional, purely military 
judgment.”118 The comment of professional judgment sticks out here, as this sentiment also 
surfaced in the 1991 generation with FM 100-2-3, stating that “[above] all, Soviet military 
training fosters professionalism.”119 As time went on and changes developed within the USSR, 
their command staff procedures were described as only continuously “being streamlined,” 
allowing initiative to be taken both at high- and low-levels of leadership.120 Even if the vast 
control network should break down, the faith in higher authority permitted tactical-level decision 
to continue in a “constructive direction.”121 This, as a result, allowed for continual “troop 
discipline and unity.”122 Of course, it goes without saying that many of these implications of 
efficiency, order, and effectiveness were idealized. Faults within the system will be touched on 
later, but for now only the language surrounding description of the Soviet army must be noted. 
This same type of admiration was also given to the technology that the Soviet military 
possessed. Previous comments on modernization of the army were overshadowed when each 
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manual began to speak of Soviet materiel in detail, allowing free use of even more supportive 
terminology. When it came to chemical protective and decontamination equipment, for instance, 
Soviet forces simply had the best equipment “in the world,” and they “know that their chemical 
capability greatly exceeds that of any other nation.”123 This theme of comparison on a global 
scale continued with specific vehicles like the HOKUM A (Kamov K-50 Black Shark) which 
was a coaxial-rotor helicopter “for which no Western counterpart exists.”124 The HOOK (Mil 
Mi-6) heavy-lift helicopter was also described as being “twice the size of any Free World 
helicopter.”125 This is our first instance of any negative terminology invading the manuals, as the 
authors imply the Western world as being inherently free. However, it seems to be an isolated 
case in a vast sea of neutral and even admirable terminology. So, it might be the largest 
assumption to infer that it might be just an adopted term used by producers of such vehicles, like 
Boeing, Sikorsky, or Lockheed Martin. Repeated contrast between “the free world” and “the 
Soviet Union” did indeed set up a dichotomy, but one in which the USSR was first among equals 
and did not carry the same negative connotations as in mainstream cultural products.126  
Other equipment and vehicles were similarly praised. The RPG-18 increased all squad’s 
effectiveness against armored vehicles and tanks, and the GIANT (SA-12b) surface-to-air missile 
systems could intercept “aircraft at all altitudes, cruise missiles, tactical ballistic missiles, and 
possibly some types of strategic ballistic missiles.”127 The T-55 tank had a “highly mobile 
chassis, a low silhouette, and exceptional long-range endurance.”128 Its successor, the T-80, had 
“improved mobility” due to a gas-turbine engine and increased capability with a smoothbore 
main gun.129 The integration of BMDs (an acronym for the Russian Boevaia Mashina Desanta / 
Боевая Машина Десанта) in airborne regiments “substantially increases the division’s 
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firepower and maneuverability.”130 The 7.62 mm Kalashnikov assault rifles were described as 
“very dependable weapons.”131 In both extreme temperatures and after total immersion in mud 
and water, both the AK and AKM variants were found to “function normally.”132 They produced 
a high volume of fire and were “simple to maintain.”133 The 14.5 mm heavy machine gun was 
also “simple in design and rugged in construction. It is considered to be reliable.”134 Much like 
their interpretation of the Soviet army in general, the manuals stated that the technology the 
soldiers possessed was rugged, reliable, and uniquely Russian. 
Their nuclear, chemical, and biological equipment in general was also apparently 
dependable and in good supply.135 Some aspects of it were even described as “rather 
ingenious.”136 Another creative and remarkably simple aid in technical logistics was the 
“extensive and effective” standardization of equipment.137 As the parts of multiple vehicles, 
weapons, and equipment were interchangeable as the technology moves forward, the benefits 
were twofold. First, repairs could be done quite easily through cannibalization of damaged or 
surplus goods on the front lines. Secondly, obsolete vehicles and weapons could be used for 
training while not necessitating a ‘legacy’ stockpile of repair parts. Almost all moving parts of 
RPK machine guns and AK/AKM assault rifles are interchangeable no matter the era of 
production, for example.138 If a damaged rifle was discarded, it could be taken apart and used to 
repair other weapons if needed. Certainly, this would sound quite appealing to any American 
soldier familiar with cleaning and maintaining their own service weapon on the front line. The 
negative language vis-à-vis the enemy that one would expect in a militarily-focused work was 
simply not present on a large and overt scale in our sources.  
In fact, a significant amount of the manual’s content was dedicated to the deconstruction 
of flawed Western modes of thinking about the Soviet Union and its military. Many instructional 
paragraphs were written to dissuade readers from adopting traditional ways of thinking, and 
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instead to force recruits to understand a Soviet mindset. First, this appeared with regards to 
classifying the basic structure of a Soviet attack. FM 100-2-1 bemoaned that “[too] many US 
analysts have used US tactical terms […] to describe Soviet offensive actions.”139 This had 
inevitably resulted in a “distorted image of Soviet actions.”140 In perhaps one of the most 
prescient and relevant comments, the manual went on to state that in order “to fully understand 
the Soviet military thought process […], the Soviet categorization must be adhered to.”141 For 
example, a “breakthrough” attack was often described by Western authors as the main avenue 
taken by the Soviet military when facing a defensive opponent. This would be an incorrect 
categorization which ignored “all options available” to a unit’s commander, and reduced this 
adversary into facile choices.142 Granted, this type of instruction specifically pertained to 
operations and tactics of the Soviet Union, which the manual quickly highlights was “not as 
thoroughly rigid as is perceived by many Western analysts.”143 When combined with the other 
choices of language, however, this points towards a common problem of American military 
authors who chose to impart their own views on the foreign agent, often “incorrectly and too 
freely.”144 This sentiment was echoed in our other manuals such as PAM 350-15, which argued 
that a vital task in training against the OPFOR opponent was to understand their terminology and 
thought processes.145 In 1984 Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger explained this concept 
in his annual report to Congress, stating that it was not enough to outspend the Soviets, but rather 
to “determine the nature and extent” of their threat.146 DDI 1100-77-76, for example, instructs 
readers on Motorized Rifle Company maneuvers based on the definitions used in “Soviet 
military literature,” not American perceptions of combat.147Not only were the manuals passively 
using language which did not reify the demonic portrayal; they actively highlighted the ways in 
which trainees could look into the mind of Soviet soldiers and adopt their perspective in order to 
better understand their approach to war and peace. True knowledge of the purported foe was 
more beneficial than any propaganda.  
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 As can be seen, the fear of the unknown did not corrupt military representations of the 
Soviet Other. Rather, those who drafted our manuals embraced and exhorted it. The language 
may have been idealized, embellished, or polished, but it avoided being vitriolic, condescending, 
or patronizing. As they tried to deconstruct or altogether ignore tropes of the Soviet Union, 
military authors instead focused on presenting the varied components of the Communist armed 
forces as complex entities. Negativity would even be dangerous for any new American recruits. 
To overestimate or demonize their foes might inspire fear or hesitation, rather than create the 
intended lust for vengeance and honorable defense of democracy and freedom. To be an under or 
uninformed recruit would harm a soldier by fostering an ignorant worldview, possibly resulting 
in fatal consequences. Portraying the Soviets as monsters was counterproductive to training. 
Still, the commentary that was present within the training manuals is only tangentially captured 
through specific key words, descriptors, and phrases hidden amongst technical and tactical 
paragraphs. 
 By skirting around issues of direct commentary and instead embracing it within the 
margins of their content, military authors were allowed to implicitly show their preconceptions 
of the Soviet soldier without providing overt, and perhaps easily critiqued, narratives which did 
not agree with what had come before. As a function of their environment, military authors – 
whom we sadly know very little about – certainly played a role in filtering a specific portrayal of 
the Soviet Other, just as their fellow authors did in civilian mediums. They were in a position of 
power for their inductees, and served as both literal and figurative authorities. Consequently, 
they had an inescapable and direct influence on how the Soviets were seen. The difference, 
however, is that the depictions in the military manuals differed from the biting, vitriolic, and 
manipulative constructions present in films, books, art, music, and civilian government 
productions. Evidently, American military training cannot be understand as just another simple 
case of regurgitating anti-Soviet rhetoric. Instead, as we will see, it was much more complex. 
Section 4 – Critiques and the issue of Maskirovka 
 The training manuals that form the source base for this thesis, however, were not purely 
filled with admiration, respect, and veneration of the Soviet military’s capabilities. The Soviet 
soldier were not solely described as impervious juggernauts. Our hypothetical trainee, once 
shown the positive aspects and defused of some previous conceptions of the Soviet military, 
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would then be taught about flaws and faults to exploit. As will be seen in the following section, 
the Department of Defense and its subdivisions did not abstain from highlighting the flaws, 
ideological pitfalls, and technological weaknesses of their counterparts on the other side of the 
globe. While the rhetoric did not inherently contain the same vitriol as some civilian/cultural 
attacks against the USSR, there remained a pattern of careful critique, estrangement, and 
othering within late Cold War American military doctrine. By examining how this critique was 
spread throughout our training manuals, ultimately encapsulated through the use of the term 
maskirovka we are able to balance the positivity and admiration of the previous section with a 
healthy amount of skepticism. While some authors, such as Tom Gervasi in Soviet Military 
Power, entered into a dialogue on the veracity of these critiques (and commendations), this 
section simply seeks to map out the existence of such discussions and the resulting stereotypes. 
Trainees were simultaneously presented with a knowing commentary of the Soviet force’s faults 
alongside the praise. And, interestingly, this was presented in a much more subtle manner which 
lacked the explicit bite of widespread mainstream propaganda. 
 The source base for American critiques undeniably had a large pool of evidence and 
subject matter to draw from, all of which could be described in opposition to the experience 
within the United States. Russians, Kazakhs, Georgians, and people from a multitude of other 
nationalities within the Soviet Union were indoctrinated into a militarily-focused and pseudo-
communist life at an early stage, with wildly varying levels of academic quality and focus.148 A 
large number of soldiers were conscripts, which presented another problem of uniformity as not 
only was the standardization of belief incongruent, so too were those drawn into the standard 
military. The majority of recruits did not enter service voluntarily, so it could be argued that they 
did not share similar goals, mindsets, and drives for their military training. Alcoholism was 
portrayed as rampant due to unfettered boredom and isolation. There was a high turnover rate for 
non-commissioned officers and lower ranks, leading to an absence of a solid intermediary 
between officers and conscripts. Outdated tanks, jets, and ships were used into much later 
generations. Equipment, such as rifles, grenades, and so on, were often sold or exchanged for 
personal goods on the black market. Ideologically, the Soviet Union’s leadership did not place as 
high a value on individual lives in comparison to their NATO opponents – leading to a much 
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higher degree of mortality for Soviet soldiers. This, perhaps only when placed in contrast with 
Western values, was depicted as sacrificing too much life for too little gain. An overriding 
emphasis was placed on offensive maneuvers, almost continuously discarding consideration of 
defensive positions. Soviet communication systems were often complex, and loyalties were split 
between commanders and the party itself. At the top level, and in the late 1980s specifically, 
leadership in the General Staff (Stavka / Ставка) faced numerous documented problems in 
efficiency, principal direction, purpose, and basic unity. After entering the military and turning 
toward doctrine instead of popular description, American soldiers were presented with evidence 
of their opponent’s alleged inadequacies.  
 A fitting starting point lay with the purely technological aspects of the Warsaw Pact 
cache – weapons, vehicles, and equipment. This provided the most overt and surface-level 
scrutiny available within the training manuals. Prior to enlisting, American personnel may have 
had some assumptions or familiarity with Soviet technology – whether it be through films, news 
media, or just popular fiction. As we have seen, overt military action involving the Soviet Union 
was prevalent in films of the 1980s such as Rambo III, Red Dawn, and Firefox, or TV series like 
Airwolf and MacGyver.149 Mock-up Hind gunships or T-72 MBTs were forged out of Western 
helicopters and armored tractors for viewers. Those with more of an espionage leaning could 
tune in to Misson: Impossible, and Octopussy, or pick up one of numerous Robert Ludlum or 
John le Carré novels to delve into a story featuring the USSR or some East European spy 
antagonists.150 As is quite evident, Soviet influence, militancy, and technology was represented 
across varying mediums of American popular culture.  
 Despite the wealth of information in fiction, real world examples may have been even 
more prevalent. Because of their production in the 1980s, the manuals targeted a generation of 
officers and service personnel that would have heard of, or even lived through, the crises of the 
Cold War such as the Cuban blockade or the Vietnam War. It would not be a too large an 
assumption to imagine that these students of military arts recognized the rugged and uniquely 
Soviet shapes of an AK-47/AKM rifle, a MiG-25 fighter, or a T-55 tank. They had ample 
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opportunity to have seen or heard of them in action in various isolated or proxy conflicts in 
previous decades. Moreover, the technology of the Soviet Union had been packaged and sold to 
the world as something distinctly other to that of the West. It came to possess a type of 
symbolism and reputation that was wholly unique, so much so that Mozambique, for example, 
incorporated a Kalashnikov-type rifle into their official emblem and national flag, stating that it 
represented both “defense and vigilance.”151 As a result of this real world knowledge, combined 
with the environment created by popular culture, many American trainees enlisting in the 
military would have had at least some preconceived notion of what the Soviets were armed with. 
 Any mystique quickly dissipated in the harsh and sometimes monotonous light of 
American analytics. The mainstay of the Soviet arsenal, the Kalashnikov rifle and its numerous 
variants, was highlighted for the numerous drawbacks inherent in its design. Typical AK-47s and 
AKMs had a large 7.62 x 39 mm bullet cartridge and a muzzle velocity of 710 meters per 
second. This was described as creating a “looping trajectory” for the bullet, resulting in 
difficulties with accuracy and “clumsy sight adjustment”152 that had to be compensated for. In 
contrast with the 5.56 x 45 mm NATO version (with a muzzle velocity of 948m/s in the M16 
branch/family/tier), the Soviet rifle sacrificed weight, speed, and aerodynamics for more impact 
energy.153 Further, the rifles experienced some possible design flaws in an exposed gas cylinder, 
which was “easily dented,” or a quickly overheating barrel which could cook off and 
prematurely explode rounds while still in the chamber.154 
Other handheld weapons, like the PK series of general-purpose machine guns, were 
similarly critiqued.155 The closing remarks concerning the handheld weapons did state that the 
PKS/PKT/PKB/PKM tiers were “easier to handle during firing, easier to care for,” and were 
“lighter” while still using a “more powerful cartridge.”156 These comments were balanced by 
other inadequacies: the choice of a non-disintegrating belt could interfere with a gunner’s 
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movements, and barrel changing was not as “fast and effective” as Western machine guns.157 
Warsaw Pact armaments – with all their intrinsic faults – gave American forces a vulnerability to 
exploit, making it more plausible for narratives where a rag-tag group of high school students 
could fend off invading Communist forces in Red Dawn. If nothing else, it is evident that 
doctrinal instructors wanted to impart the knowledge that these weapons were deadly, functional, 
and rugged, but they were not infallible, despite the praise given to the Soviet forces in other 
sections of the manuals. 
 As FM 100-2-3 Troops, Organization, and Equipment moved on from the man-portable 
weapons, critique was similarly scattered throughout the descriptions of vehicles and aircraft 
from the USSR. The curved shape of the T-55’s turret, for example, was said to have good 
ballistic qualities, but created “cramped working environments” which resulted in a “slow rate of 
fire.”158 The T-55 had a lower silhouette than the American M60, but the armor was considered 
“thin by Western standards.”159 Its loading and aiming equipment was crude; it possessed no 
chemical or biological air filtration; could fire effectively from defilade due to low depression 
angles; and the positioning of the crew, ammunition, and fuel storage provided vulnerable axes 
of attack. As a result of the Afghanistan conflict, the T-55/62 was also cited by analysts for its 
inadequacy in the mountainous terrain, who stated that they were “of little use” to Soviet 
forces.160 Perhaps due to its popularity and production numbers, the T-55 received the most 
numerous criticisms in the Soviet arsenal. Less prolific vehicles, such as the PMP bridge 
builders, received only a solitary mention of how they were “extremely vulnerable to air attack 
and artillery.”161  
 Another popular piece of equipment was the iconic Soviet helicopter, the Mil Mi-24 
Hind-D. Nicknamed “Satan’s Chariot” by the mujahedeen, this double-bubble canopy aircraft 
received a similar amount of disparaging as the T-55 main battle tank.162 Similar to the American 
experience in Vietnam, Afghanistan put a larger emphasis on rotary craft rather than tracked or 
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wheeled ground vehicles for the Soviet forces. However, this increased reliance also resulted in 
an opportunity for outsiders to witness the helicopter’s disadvantages. The Hind, remolded into 
an attack variant from an initial troop-carrying design, presented a large profile which made it 
easier to detect and target by opposition.163 This made it especially vulnerable to surface-to-air 
missiles, like the Soviet SA-7, British Blowpipe, and later American-supplied FIM-92 Stinger, 
which all “posed a grave threat” throughout the conflict.164 Its rotor configuration was also 
described as making it less agile than the “Soviets would like,” and the craft was similarly 
difficult to maneuver at low speeds or in hover states.165 At high speeds it had a wide turning 
radius, which made it struggle when fighting enemy helicopters. While not relevant for the 
specific case of Afghanistan, it is notable that American doctrine continuously hypothesized how 
equipment like the Hind would fare against equally-developed forces.  
The picking apart of the Hind, the T-55, and the AK/AKM highlights a pattern within the 
American doctrinal scholarship. As was shown in the previous section, analysts were more than 
willing to respect, and even praise, the abilities of the technology that was employed by Soviet 
soldiers. But here, the ominous Hind had its reputed fangs removed, the rugged T-55 was shown 
to be a clunking detriment, and the iconic Kalashnikov was dragged through the mud. What we 
must extricate from these esoteric analytics is that there was a concerted effort by the 
Department of Defense to bring notions of Soviet weapons and technology down to reality. 
Especially noteworthy is that this was a matter of understanding, not projecting dominance or 
fear mongering. The goal with these documents appears to be highlighting the strengths and 
weaknesses of the enemy – not debating who was better, stronger, or more able.166 Though there 
were direct comparisons between the Eastern and Western blocs, they were predominantly cases 
of using something American soldiers were familiar with to get a framework within which to 
understand the foreign weaponry. On average, it appeared that when discussing technology, the 
US experts presented a similar amount of critique alongside their praise and respect. It is, 
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however, when moving toward a discussion of tactics that a more distinctly “Soviet” personality 
begins to appear amidst the previous language of neutrality. It revolved around the idea of 
something called maskirovka. 
 In 1987, Major Daniel W. Krueger of the School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort 
Leavenworth released a short monograph titled Maskirovka—What’s in it for Us? In the text, 
Krueger explains that: 
The amalgamated concept of camouflage, concealment, and deception is 
expressed by the Soviets with the term “maskirovka.” While direct translations 
of the single word “maskirovka” may vary, the Defense Intelligence Agency 
considers “deception” as the closest single word English language translation. 
Interestingly, the second edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia 
parenthetically defines the term “maskirovka” as “military khitrost,” a term for 
which Clausewitz’s “cunning” would be an acceptable translation.167 
Khitrost’ can also be translated as a ‘stratagem.’ Therefore, readers can take away that 
maskirovka, when used in the context of American military manuals, referred to the deceptive 
qualities of the Soviet (and later Russian) forces.168 As the title of the work implied, Major 
Krueger compared United States doctrine with Soviet maskirovka practices, reasoning that 
American forces had something to learn from the scope and implementation of their opponent’s 
abilities. Before delving into his analysis, Krueger stated that there was a possible perception 
among analysts that Soviet deception was “the factor to be reckoned with should war break out 
between the two nations.”169 With this in mind, Krueger pushed forward to see what lessons the 
Defense Intelligence Agency could garner from comparing two vastly different approaches to 
disguise, deception, and diversion. 
 According to his research, Krueger concluded that the United States had a much more 
limited scope, range, understanding of, and overarching goals in regards to deception within the 
armed forces – especially when contrasted with the Soviets. Both militaries understood that the 
“Crux of the issue is hiding the real and displaying the false”; Krueger, however, concluded that 
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the Soviets emphasized the former while American doctrine emphasized the latter.170 Further, the 
belief in surprise was reinforced as being predominantly respected beyond the Iron Curtain, but 
faltering in the West. Drawing on the 1984 version of the Soviet strategic manual Taktika, 
Krueger highlighted that “the element of surprise has long been the most important principle of 
the art of war” from the USSR’s perspective.171 In the United States, however, Krueger admitted 
that “[skepticism] is likely to remain in much of the army until it sees that deception is indeed 
executable.”172 There was a demonstrable hole in American training and literature in regards to 
the topic – something which Krueger hoped to change with his short monograph. 
 The most important takeaway from Krueger’s analysis is the knowledge that there was a 
severe disparity between Soviet and American understandings, implementation, and desire for 
deception on a grand scale. In the United States, there was a rooted skepticism which higher-
echelon theorists like Krueger needed to dispel and assuage. In Warsaw Pact nations, maskirovka 
was respected, widely implemented, and lauded as an important force multiplier. Simply put, the 
Soviets were understood – and portrayed – as a more deceptive fighting force. To return to one 
of Major Krueger’s opening lines, some facets of the American civilian or military communities 
believed maskirovka to be a reckoning actor throughout the Cold War. Deception could therefore 
be understood, in the minds of American analysts, as integral to the Soviet identity. As a 
counterbalance to the praise and respect of the previous chapter, maskirovka represented a 
divergent narrative of critique and suspicion. While it may be argued that maskirovka, as 
understood by Krueger and like-minded individuals, represented a further nod toward the ability 
of the Soviets, the need for a positive spin on the concept against a skeptical military community 
might instead be seen as an exception to the rule. Krueger was arguing against a community 
which saw maskirovka as something separate and distinctly Soviet. In other words, maskirovka 
was the epitome of othering within Cold War American military training. 
 With this in mind, we can turn back toward our training manuals to see how these 
perceptions were embodied in the guiding doctrine of the United States. As we know from an 
earlier reference, the 1984 FM 100-2-1 The Soviet Army: Operations and Tactics spoke toward 
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the “general purpose ground forces” of the Soviet Union.173 As is familiar, the authors began by 
laying out a basic understanding of the Soviet approach to war and its underlying tenets. What 
immediately stands out to readers in this context is the ideal to “[deceive] the enemy. Attack 
from an unexpected direction at an unexpected time.”174 A few lines later, American analysts 
commented these principles serve “as a basis from which any examination of Soviet operations 
and tactics must start,” and it seems the authors took this lesson to heart.175  When commenting 
on the generalized withdrawal of Soviet troops, Operations and Tactics stated that a security 
echelon will be left whose sole mission was to “delay and deceive the enemy” for as long as 
possible, hopefully forcing pursuers to deploy prematurely.176 The remainder of the withdrawing 
force “can be expected to resort to deception, movement at night” and periods of reduced 
visibility, as well as enacting “cover preparations.”177 In discussing diversionary tactics, both 
“dummy” observation posts and “decoy” flights have been observed, requiring a wary 
apprehension to both reconnaissance and radar detection. Smoke doctrine and capabilities were 
also described as “impressive”; they could range from blinding smoke, camouflage engine 
exhaust, or decoy deployments.178 Essentially, a continuous motif of Soviet deception was spread 
throughout the manuals – something which did not have a direct equivalent in American military 
doctrine at the time. 
 Interestingly, the maskirovka descriptor itself endured long past the collapse of the 
USSR. After 1991, American military manuals still referred to deceitful tactics by any and all 
enemies through this familiar Russian term. The TRADOC Pamphlet 350-14 Heavy OPFOR 
Operational Art Handbook, for example, purported in 1994 that it is “not simply [an] 
unclassified [handbook] on the forces of a particular nation.” 179 Rather, the pamphlet described a 
generalized forced composed of multiple composites, which could broadly be applied to any 
foreign army as needed for training purposes. However, the work continued to refer to operations 
involving disinformation or deception simply as maskirovka.180 Perhaps maskirovka persisted 
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into the 1990s and 2000s as a simple shorthand borrowed from the Cold War, or it could be just 
one facet of a composite faux military force to theoretically train against. Despite both these 
reasonable claims, the term maskirovka inherently possesses an association born out of its origins 
in the Cold War, and the word denotes a distinctly Soviet way of thinking. Invocation of the 
word automatically attaches itself to a foreign style of warfare that, while adopted by American 
forces, was officially viewed as something separate and distinct from the Western sphere.  
  Through maskirovka, we are able to see that even in their attempts to balance praise with 
censure, more complex disparities are being highlighted. This is not abject fear mongering or 
bravado-filled denouncements. Presented alongside the admiration for the armed forces of the 
USSR was a necessary amount of criticism. Just as new trainees would be intimidated by an 
unstoppable red menace, so too would they be ineffective and overconfident against a flimsy, 
rough-shod military stricken by alcoholism and corruption. Manuals such as FM 100-2-1 were 
attempting to teach their soldiers, rather than to indoctrinate them. Trainees were presented with 
a realistic and ultimately balanced evaluation of the Soviet soldier – something which could be 
seen as being in direct conflict with the portrayals found in popular culture. However, as 
maskirovka hints at, there was still a looming issue beyond the surface spectrum of technology 
and ability. Attached to evaluations of weaponry, training, and tactics, American service 
personnel were being guided and trained on the importance of another facet of their opponents: 
the Soviet identity. 
Section 5 – Training and Soviet Identity 
 When American trainees flipped through their manuals, they came upon this transcribed 
passage from the Soviet military oath. Interestingly, it was only slightly longer than the 
American Oath of Enlistment, and shared some common terminology. While its inclusion here 
may seem a bit out of place, it does provide an important template for understanding the values 
and notions that were impressed upon Soviet oath-takers and American readers. 
I, [Name], a citizen of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, by joining the 
ranks of the armed forces; take an oath and solemnly swear to be an upright, 
brave, disciplined, vigilant soldier, to strictly preserve military and 
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government secrets, and to execute without contradiction, all military 
regulations and orders of commanders and superiors.181 
As we have seen so far, typical American service personnel would be (re-)introduced to 
their Soviet opponent in both positive and critical ways. The significant takeaway from the 
previous section, however, is the underlying current of difference that the rhetoric and language 
surrounding maskirovka hints at. Soldiers may recognize the iconic but flawed Kalashnikovs, but 
what about the people holding them? How did they train? Why did they fight? What was their 
culture like, or how different was their upbringing? Why were they, at their core, set up as 
diametric opposites to the Americans reading our manuals? By examining the ways in which 
Russian or Soviet forces were described and portrayed as different, we can measure precisely 
how military instruction either adopted to, or forged away from, the dominant American zeitgeist 
at the time of their publication. 
 Presenting your opponent as someone otherworldly and only vaguely recognizable is a 
concept as old as warfare itself, and the epistemological foundation of the Soviet soldier as an 
‘other’ was one that has been crafted over a period of time long before the emergence of the 
post-World War II Cold War. Almost a full century before containment-advocate George F. 
Kennan authored The Sources of Soviet Conduct in 1947, his great-uncle George Kennan trekked 
across the Siberian expanse before returning to the United States to repudiate the Russian 
imperial system.182 Before Korea and Vietnam, there were the American expeditionary forces in 
Vladivostok and Arkhangelsk. As historians like David S. Foglesong have demonstrated, the 
mercurial relationship between the United States and both Imperial and Soviet Russia began long 
before the supposed rift between communist and capitalist superpowers. Whether perceived as a 
product of clashing ideology or the vying of two developing global forces, this relationship was 
also tied to global pre- and post-war national trajectories and identity. As such, this complex 
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relationship can be seen as being catalyzed – not created – by the power dynamics left in the 
wake of the Second World War.  
 As the world ostensibly left imperialism behind, the relatively new nation-state became 
the dominant polity for many emerging constructed communities. In lieu of vast tracts of lands, 
peoples, and cultures overseen by a centralized metropole, the vertically composed nation-state 
was being drawn up amid the skeletons of empire. In the Russian case, an imposed uniformity 
became the norm under Soviet rule, as the country’s leadership pitched a global workers 
revolution stemming from their union of republics. The United States, similarly breaking bonds 
with old empire, began its own pursuit of global ambitions by utilizing a narrative of 
interventionism in the name of democracy and freedom. As Theodore Geiger wrote for the 
Council on Foreign Relations in 1967, “the security of Western society rests predominantly upon 
the power and will to action of the United States.”183 In both cases, it became increasingly 
important to justify the unity of local homogenous groups through imagined national 
communities. Defining a nation-state’s individuality and difference, naturally, became one way 
of fulfilling this goal. 
  These fragile identities were more easily supported if one could provide an outside, 
foreign foil. The leaders of the USSR viewed their nation as a bastion of democracy and 
advocate for the progressive force of socialist and communist revolution. American officials, 
similarly, considered their country the hub of democracy and progressivism under the banner of 
liberty and entrepreneurship. The power of difference emphasized an outsider in order to 
maintain and justify an internal conformity or shared identity. For the purposes of this analysis, 
the veracity of the portrayals are secondary to the performances themselves. Accurate or 
exaggerated, acts of othering are the key factors which must be delineated from paragraphs of 
tactical detail and technical data. As both fresh and experienced American personnel sat down 
and studied their opponent, they asked what kind of person may face them across the battlefield. 
Who were these soldiers?  The answers they came up can be discerned in the military training 
manuals they created. 
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I swear to learn conscientiously the trade of war, to protect with all means 
the military and peoples’ property, and to be devoted to my people, my Soviet 
homeland, and the Soviet Government to my last breath. 
If Cold War America could be seen as fostering business acuity in its encouraging paper 
routes and lemonade stands, then the USSR could be argued to have taken an approach that 
pushed its population towards a military outlook on life. At least, that is how enlisted Americans 
were presented with the Soviet Union’s approach to its population. Allegedly, civilian and 
military life was interchangeable. Military needs unilaterally superseded those of the civilian 
sphere. One example comes from 1968, when our manuals described a large rear-force 
mobilization which drew “directly from the civilian economy of cargo trucks and other 
specialized equipment.”184 Though the passage was in actuality a comment concerning 
preparations for the Operation Danube invasion of Czechoslovakia, it stands as a presumed 
example of how willing the USSR was to siphon resources from one sphere of life to another. 
This practice became so routine within the Soviet Union that outside analysts determined that 
multiple divisions could be conjured up within a few months using “civilian trucks and large 
stockpiles of older weapons and equipment.”185 These makeshift civilian detachments could then 
be used “effectively” against second and lower tier NATO forces.186 The emphasis on easing the 
transition between civilian and military life also supposedly reflected the USSR’s view of the 
civilian world as coming second to military needs. Though Soviet leaders may not desire war, 
they were said to “prepare for it continuously,” so much so that their political and economic 
systems “give priority to military requirements.”187 On paper, the society presented to American 
service personnel was undoubtedly a battle-ready one, even if that came at the expense of the 
republic itself. 
As a result, many facets of the non-combatant world were inexorably entwined with the 
martial one. The national economy was viewed as a single unit, whereas in the United States 
there was still some semblance of separation between the Department of Defense and the private 
sector, no matter the concerns over a powerful, growing military-industrial complex. If people in 
the United States feared a military juggernaut supplied by a civilian economy, just such a 
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situation was presented as normally occurring in the Soviet Union at the time. Rather than an end 
in itself, the civilian (or national) economy was the engine driving the armed forces of 
communism and socialism forward.188 The Heavy OPFOR Tactical Handbook described how 
Soviet society utilized centralized planning to ensure “coordination of civilian production with 
military requirements.”189 According to The Soviet Union: A Country Study, many servicemen 
“were assigned non-military duties that in many other countries were performed by civilians.”190 
Construction, repair, and transport groups, loosely labeled as the Soviet reserves, continued 
transporting, repairing, and constructing during peacetime. Further, until the early 1990s, the 
Soviet General Staff was still heavily involved with planning how best to use “military force for 
civilian control.”191 To see armed or uniformed infantrymen in a Russian city or working locally 
was normal and their presence would not be given much notice. In the United States, however, 
such an event would raise quite an alarm – unless some kind of training exercise was underway 
nearby or the National Guard had been deployed. Simply put, American service personnel were 
being taught that in the USSR, the border between civilian and military spheres was porous and 
fluid, if it existed at all. The two ways of life just did not have the same air of separation that was 
present in the United States. 
American readers were then presented with a wealth of information on just how early 
Soviet citizens were integrated into this nationwide preparation for war. Long before a man or 
woman swore the military oath quoted earlier, citizens were supposedly well on their way to 
learning the “trade of war.” At age ten, Soviet children entered the Vladimir Lenin All-Union 
Pioneer Organization. Activities within this Scout-like group included discipline and physical 
training, as well as “military-patriotic indoctrination.”192 In 1967 the system was further 
entrenched by the Law on Universal Military Service, which “established a compulsory system 
of premilitary training for all young men and women aged 16 through 18.”193 The manuals 
described how this later training took place in high schools, specialized secondary schools, trade 
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schools, factories, offices, and farms. At every stage in life the Soviet system was evidently 
determined to provide its people with a “fundamental knowledge of the military” and “military-
technical skills” to ease their eventual transition.194 Refresher courses to maintain acquired 
abilities were administered until an individual was removed from the pool of service at age 50 
(65 if you were an officer).195 Deferment from service was infrequent. Educational, hardship, and 
compassionate deferments were also reduced with the 1967 service law.  
While the infrastructure necessary to impart paramilitary skills began in elementary 
school, it received even more attention at the secondary level since DOSAAF (the Volunteer 
Society for Cooperation with the Army, Aviation, and Fleet, an organization which focused on 
sports, physical activities, and paramilitary training for its inductees) then became involved. 
DOSAAF worked in conjunction with the State Committee for Vocational and Technical 
Education, and the Ministry of Education, which had entire departments dedicated to pre-military 
training.196 As the manuals detailed, as early as ages 15 and 16 students had classes on wheeled 
and tracked vehicles, parachuting, radio maintenance, and rifle drills.197 Their instruction could 
be equated to that given to fresh Soviet Army draftees before the pre-military system was put in 
place in 1967. Accordingly, this was also done with the “maximum possibly cooperation of local 
military forces,”198 in an interesting use of terminology and imagery. A similarly unique word 
choice indicated that an extensive “toughening” of pre-draft youths occurred under the banner of 
the Komsomol’s “Ready for Labor and Defense” program in attempt to ensure that citizens were 
in peak physical condition.199 To American trainees, this could be seen as an exaggerated and 
extremely militarized version of the Boy Scouts of America or Reserve Officer Training Corps 
initiative. At its core, the Soviet Union was presented as a society deeply entrenched with the 
perceived virtues of militarization and physical prowess. To achieve its goal the USSR had 
created a vast network within which to forge able citizens to defend the motherland. And it 
certainly had the raw material to pass through the flames. 
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I will always be ready to report, by order of the Soviet Government, as a 
soldier of the armed forces for the defense of my homeland, the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics. 
Covering over one-sixth of the earth’s inhabited land mass, and possessing a population 
of just over 286 million in 1989, the USSR had huge pool from which to draw its citizen-
soldiers.200 And, unlike the (shifting) all-volunteer American forces, the Soviets had no qualms 
about drawing from it unabashedly. In their seventeenth year, all men headed to the military 
commissariat in February and March to register for military service. In emergency situations 
women were also conscripted to fill typically non-combat roles, thereby allowing more men to 
transfer to active operations. At the release of FM 100-2-3, it is indicated that there were 
approximately 10,000 women in the Soviet armed forces, but those numbers had gone as high as 
800,000 during WWII.201 As we have seen, the majority of the population were simply seen as 
active service personnel waiting in limbo for a call to arms. 
Those comprising this group come from all cultures, faiths, and geographic parts of the 
Soviet Union, so not surprisingly the American manuals touched on the specifics of how this 
diversity informed an overall combat effectiveness. According to FM 100-2-3, the “quality” of 
the Great Russian element “is generally good.” Youths were “physically hardy” and were overall 
“better educated, more sophisticated, and substantially better trained than their World War II 
predecessors.” A conscript was sternly disciplined, received few luxuries, and was the target of 
intense indoctrination. On the other hand, the morale of the Soviet soldier was “relatively high” 
based on a “genuine love of his native land,” and he supposedly had a high capacity to 
“withstand deprivations.” Ultimately, the draftees were understood as “on par with their 
counterparts in the West.” Hence, a narrative was created that underscored the respectable 
quality of Soviet recruits.202 The earliest manual in our collection, from 1977, highlights the 
discipline and drive of these recruits. The typical recruit has “no civilian clothes, no privately 
owned vehicle, little money, and no nearby girlfriend. He is a 24 hours-a-day, 7-days-a-week 
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soldier.”203 On average their dedication is unparalleled. To be conscripted into the Soviet 
military is both “an honor and a duty.”204 
Despite this overall strong core, some negative light was shed on the faults that inevitably 
stemmed from the problems of attempting to train a population as large and diverse as that of the 
Soviet Union. Incompetent teachers, overbearing superiors, language conflicts, padded numbers, 
and non-combat assignments were all noted as hindering the efforts of the military cadre. 
Further, racial inequality was also highlighted as inhibiting the creation of a strong unified force. 
Military administrators were deemed to view non-Slavs as “potentially unreliable frontline 
troops.”205 Leadership positions were also similarly skewed, as Slavs comprised 95% of the 
officer corps.206 Rather than succeed in imposing homogeneity among the forces of the 
communist revolution, service in the armed forces was “reportedly more likely to increase ethnic 
and linguistic consciousness,”207 a large inconvenience to revolutionary conformity.  
Even in highlighting these faults, however, the manuals maintained a balanced critique. 
In a paragraph depicting these issues that plague the Soviet military – if not the Union itself – the 
anonymous authors ended by saying that these “shortcomings are the same as those found in any 
army throughout the world,” and that there is “no doubt” that the Soviet armed forces are some 
of the most professional and best trained in the world. At least in terms of their different 
composition, military integration, and training approach, the Soviet military faces similar 
problems to other professional forces around the world. The issue of a differentiation, however, 
intensified when it came to violence and the USSR’s general approach to war.208  
I swear to defend it bravely and wisely with all my strength and in honor, 
without sparing my blood and without regard for my life if achieve a complete 
victory over the enemy.  
With a history so meaningfully entwined with violence and death, it seems natural to 
contain within the oath a willingness to sacrifice oneself in the service of a larger good – in this 
case, the complete victory over the enemy. As described in FM-100-2-1, the Soviets as a nation 
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had suffered more than 40 million deaths in the three decades between the Russian Revolution 
and the end of the Second World War. In what seems like a knowing understatement the manual 
ended its description of this loss by noting that the “[USSR’s] tolerance for sacrifice is high.”209 
As was explored in a wider scope throughout Russian and Soviet history, the populace had faced 
and become intimately familiar with death and violence, accepting it as a normalized part of life. 
In other sections of the manuals, we can see this attitude reflected in brief commentary on 
willingness to expend resources at any cost to achieve battlefield objectives. For example, Soviet 
air power was described as “willing to accept great losses” using old or obsolete aircraft if they 
believed it could succeed in “crippling enemy tactical air power.”210 Similarly, it was assumed 
that heavy losses of deep-penetration forces would be acceptable if they could result in the 
“collapse of an enemy’s defensive structure before he could resort to use of nuclear weapons.”211 
Loss of life was not an honorable possibility but a necessary sacrifice, and American analysts 
evidently used this notion to justify painting the Soviet people as an altogether different sort. It 
was assumed that the Soviets were well acquainted with using – and being the target of – 
violence, which had led to a certain level of desensitization.  
The personal statement of sacrifice within the oath also reflects the larger Soviet battle 
plan and approach to large scale conflict. According to American analysts, the Soviets “have 
determined that the only way to win such a war is by offensive operations.”212 In its opening 
lines, The Soviet Army: Operations and Tactics described the Soviet basic principle of land 
warfare as “violent, sustained, and deep offensive action.”213 In the Department of the Army’s 
own Operations manual, Soviet doctrine was similarly described as based on the “principle of 
mass” and victory through “relentless offensive operations,”214 and that defense was only a 
“temporary” form of combat.215 If placed in such a position as needing to defend and repel 
opponents, Soviet forces would “stubbornly [hold] key defensive positions” before “decisively 
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counterattacking to defeat enemy penetrations.”216 A real world illustration of objectives may 
help clarify the difference between the Soviet and American approaches to war.  
In the non-linear combat of the late 20th century, commanders highlighted objectives for 
their subordinates to focus on by circling key points on a map, termed “goose-eggs”. In the 
United States, as described by the Heavy OPFOR Tactical Handbook, commanders would circle 
key terrain for their troops to capture and hold - take a specific hill or overlook, for example. 
OPFOR commanders, on the other hand, would highlight enemy troops. To American military 
authors, the Soviet battle plan did not “rely heavily upon the seizure and consolidation of key 
terrain.”217 The goal was not the capture of abstract objectives. It was to find and eliminate 
enemy forces wherever they were. Whether one strategy or the other was more practical is 
outside the scope of this analysis. However, the conduct of fighting was evidently different. One 
side was clearly portrayed as indelibly focused on the destruction of its opponent as the main 
process of war. The historical legacy of violence informed the approach to combat itself. 
This might have had twofold effect on the mind of the American soldier. First, the notion 
spoke to an enemy who was willing to give up their own life for the pursuits of the greater union. 
Purportedly, this was undertaken with much less stigma and hesitation than in the United States. 
Though there is no reason to think that an American soldier was any less willing to sacrifice 
himself for the greater good, but the portrayal of motivation, willingness, and dressings 
surrounding the act are markedly different. Secondly, the idea also implied that Soviet 
commanders were willing to utilize their population in such ways to achieve their war goals. 
Massive, relentless, and violent fronts were favored over slow encroachment. The USSR would 
overwhelm its opponents with a seemingly unlimited amount of manpower. Again, the difference 
may not be in the action – willingness to use military force with all its ramifications – but in the 
narrative surrounding such an action. Human lives were another resource to be shaped, 
expended, and discarded in service of larger goals. 
Should I break my solemn oath, may sever penalties of the Soviet Law, the 
overall hatred, and the contempt of the working masses strike me. 
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According to American military instructors, these driving forces related to the largest 
aspect of differentiation between the superpower blocs at the time: ideology. Purportedly the 
main factor separating the USSR and the USA, the clash of political and social ideology was put 
forth as the core tenet for why Soviet soldiers were so strikingly different than their American 
counterparts. Here, we can also see how this idea was embodied in the final lines of the military 
oath, in which failure inflicts the wrath of the working masses on an inadequate servant. Of 
course, while there is much to debate over the implementation or reality of communism, 
socialism, or any other structure of power within the USSR, here we need only understand it as a 
label applied to outsiders by the American military sphere. The intricacies and weight 
surrounding the term are not as relevant as the justifications ideology allowed Department of 
Defense authors to make about the citizens under its effect. 
In a direct and upfront manner, multiple publications put out by the American military 
training department articulated that war for the Soviets was “a manifestation of the class 
struggle.”218 War was regrettable but inevitable given the harsh divide between the “progressive 
forces of socialism” and the “reactionary forces of imperialistic capitalism.”219 War was a 
continuation of politics, not the last effort when politics failed. Interestingly, it seems that 
American descriptions posited that this dichotomy was crafted on the opposing side of the Iron 
Curtain. Whether or not Americans actually believed in this contrast was tacitly left unsaid. 
Instead this construction is laid at the feet of Soviet political and military theorists who 
purportedly set up a “correlation of forces” between the capitalist and communist camps.220 A 
reactionary force indeed, Americans perceived – or at least portrayed – themselves as existing 
and fighting in this new superpower dynamics only as a consequence of foreign perspectives. 
The blame was put on the USSR rather than both power blocs for creating the global struggle. 
Despite these issues, however, the Soviet concept of war (and society itself) was definitively 
couched in the idea of social revolution according to American military authors. In their eyes, 
socialism would progress by both violent and nonviolent means, but war in favor of socialist 
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objectives would always be considered warranted by Soviet officials since they believed that 
class wars were just, and predatory wars were unjust.221  
Similarly, the vast military training system in the Soviet Union was only rivaled by the 
political structure which was tasked with instructing, clarifying, and enforcing the perspective of 
the Party. The Pioneers, Komsomol, DOSAAF, and other paramilitary groups spent significant 
effort on the political indoctrination of their membership prior to these young people actually 
joining the armed forces.222 In the military itself, the Main Political Directorate (MPA) diffused 
the same political outlook throughout the higher tier chain of command.223 At lower levels the 
MPA are represented by a zampolit, a political officer, who was placed in each regiment, 
battalion, and company. Importantly, the zampolit’s authority was independent to that of the 
military commander as they were primarily responsible for improving the “political loyalty” and 
the “patriotism” of the troops.224 Before an offensive, political officers would exhort soldiers “to 
be brave and complete the unit task with ‘uplifted spirits.’”225 While this political officer did not 
make military decisions, they did have a “considerable influence” on the general policy and 
political direction of the unit.226 If a Soviet citizen had somehow escaped or lost faith in the 
Party’s interpretation of Marxist-Leninism, there were safeguards in place to reinforce that 
perspective within the armed forces as well as a larger, societal-level inculcation of the proper 
mode of thinking. The global development of communism and socialism, which had allegedly 
been fomented by the minds of Soviet thinkers, was then taken all the way down to the level of a 
private and dispersed amongst all ranks of the USSR’s war machine. As the much more eloquent 
1977 FM 30-102 puts it, the “opposing forces soldier receives political indoctrination from birth 
to grave.”227 
                                                          
221 Zickel, ed., PAM 550-95 Soviet Union, 655. 
222 Interestingly, the brief mentions of indoctrination belie just how strongly this was emphasized in non-military 
sections of American society. The entrenchment into a ‘Soviet’ outlook was portrayed as a combat benefit and 
completely bucked the notion of dehumanization and terminology like “slaves, pawns, automatons, puppets, drones, 
and zombies” used by civilian authors. See Matthew W. Dunne, A Cold War State of Mind: Brainwashing and 
Postwar American Society (Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 2013), 57. 
223 FM 100-2-3 Troops, Organization and Equipment, 2-5. 
224 FM 100-2-3 Troops, Organization and Equipment, 2-5 to 2-6. 
225 Major A. E. Hemesley, DDI-1120-10-77 Soviet Tank Battalion Tactics (Washington: Defense Intelligence 
Agency, 1977), 22. 
226 FM 100-2-1 Operations and Tactics, 3-3. 
227 FM 30-102 Opposing Forces Europe, 1-3. 
R i c e  | 57 
In 2001, Ron Robin released his monograph The Making of the Cold War Enemy, which 
detailed how behavioral scientists of the era took part in perpetuating an image of the Soviets 
which “reflected and fueled predominant ideological strains within the American body 
politic.”228 In their own capacity, they were both “observers of, and active participants in, 
defining the meaning of the Cold War.”229 The authors of our training manuals served a similar 
function in defining a specific aspect of the American Cold War narrative. Though not the sole 
arbiters of the Soviet image, military instructors (and their writings) had a significant role in 
filtering a specific concept of the USSR down to the developing troops. Soldiers were instructed 
in the methods and means of their opponent: how they fought, how they were equipped, and 
most importantly, how they supposedly thought. Just as politicians, policymakers, academics, 
and cultural figures took part in crafting an image of the Soviet enemy, so too did military 
authors and instructors participate in consolidating an abstract construction of the Soviet other. 
The Soviet forces had both positive and negative aspects to their abilities, equipment, and 
function, but they were altogether portrayed as something different than the soldiers of the 
United States. Their identity - who they were and what they believed - was distinct and separate.  
By highlighting what aspects of Soviet life these authors deemed necessary to convey to 
students, we can infer what type of image they were hoping to create. Authors chose to 
emphasize societal-military composition, ethnic unity or disunity, ideology, and other topics 
which seem tertiary to the conduct of war itself. But, their inclusion speaks to the idea that these 
aspects of the Soviet society and psyche were precisely what influenced their conduct of Soviet 
troops in combat. And in a clever narrative construction, American authors found a way to 
perform and describe a global power confrontation while simultaneously excusing themselves 
from its creation. In this perspective, the Soviet approach to war – the very existence of their 
nation – was based on a rhetoric of differentiation from the reactionary West. Americans were 
simply performing their part in a play they seemingly had no hand in creating. This is a much 
more nuanced approach than the overt vilification present in other Cold War cultural products. It 
did not involve a blatant attempt to paint the opponent as “wrong” or “evil,” but rather a 
rewriting of the narrative. The Self was a product of the Other, rather than the other way around. 
                                                          
228 Ron Robin, The Making of the Cold War Enemy: Culture and Politics in the Military-Industrial Complex 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 15. 
229 Robin, The Making of the Cold War Enemy, 15. 
R i c e  | 58 
Section 6 – Encapsulation: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons 
With this concept of a unique Soviet identity in our mind, we (as well as our hypothetical 
soldier) can turn toward our final topic: nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (NBCs) 
within the Soviet arsenal. Throughout the Cold War, Western culture arguably perceived itself as 
continuously teetering on the brink of nuclear Armageddon. In a social environment where bomb 
shelters were widely advertised, “duck and cover” was taught in elementary schools, and novels 
like Fail-Safe to say nothing of films such as Dr. Strangelove were released, the American 
populace was undeniably left with a perception of Soviet leaders with their fingers on the literal 
button. But what were American soldiers taught about those piloting the nuclear armed bombers? 
Or about the decontaminators working in the chemical divisions and the scientists in hidden 
biological research facilities? Here we can gain some insight into just how divergent the internal 
teachings of the US Armed Forces were from the larger cultural narrative of the Cold War. 
Examples of NBC weapons include hydrogen bombs, genetically engineered anthrax, and 
Sarin nerve gas, respectively. Surprisingly, this subject received relatively little analysis on the 
part of the Department of Defense; its comments were predominantly encapsulated only in 
isolated or closing chapters of manuals such as FM-100-2, FM-100-3, PAM-350-16, and The 
Soviet Union: A Country Study. Even FM-101-31-1, the staff officer’s field manual on the 
employment doctrine and procedures for nuclear weapons, relegated discussion of Soviet policy 
to a short paragraph. However, what was written about them speaks towards a more realistic 
understanding of NBC weapons than would initially be assumed. While we might be quick to 
think of the Cold War as intrinsically associated with mushroom clouds, intercontinental ballistic 
missiles, and mutually assured destruction, the evidence suggests that the US military viewed 
NBC weapons as simply another facet of combat. Not only does the language surrounding Soviet 
NBCs echo the respect and objectivity seen in previous sections, but also gives a very balanced 
examination of the USSR’s reluctance to utilize weapons of mass destruction.230 The concept of 
a menacing red threat possessing biological, chemical, and atomic weapons only barely held in 
check by retaliation is completely absent. What is present, however, is an altogether respectful – 
and somewhat detached – appreciation for the abilities of the unconventional Soviet arsenal. We 
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may also keep in mind that, as in the previous sections, there is no fear mongering or 
glorification. Instead, within the pages of American training manuals readers find a complicated 
portrayal of Soviet perspective, ideology, and ability based on their nuclear, chemical, and 
biological agents. We can therefore use the discussion of NBCs as a final case study of how the 
United States military would present one aspect of Soviet military life – including all the praise, 
admiration, othering, and measured critique present in our previous discussions. New to us, 
however, is exactly how different NBC weapons were presented in contrast to public perception, 
civilian instructions, and popular culture.  
It can be argued that the NBC category is one of the most effective, efficient, and morally 
questionable part of any military’s arsenal. While the awe-inspiring power of fusion, fission, and 
combination weapons have only changed the face of warfare in the previous century, chemical 
and biological warfare have been known for quite some time. During the Peloponnesian War, 
Sparta is recorded as having ignited sulfur to envelope Athenian defenses. Hannibal filled clay 
pots with venomous snakes, and the Mongols launched plague-infected corpses over the walls of 
besieged settlements. As the industrial era took hold, venomous arrowheads and toxic plants 
transitioned into a weaponized form on a much larger scale. Artillery utilized shells filled with 
nightshade, tallow, rosin, saltpeter, and eventually chlorine during World War I. Weaponized 
anthrax, botulism, and typhoid were present in both great wars of the 20th century. As a result of 
the Manhattan Project in the United States, and the work of Igor Kurchatov, Andrei Sakharov 
and other researchers in the USSR, nuclear weapons rounded out the NBC category into what are 
predominantly known as weapons of mass destruction.  
In United States military training, pre-1945 wars were described as having a slow ebb-
and-flow. The changing of fronts, battle lines, and theatres of combat were based on the 
relatively stable numerical ratio of personnel and equipment. This is what was known as the 
correlation of forces and means (COFM),231 and it could only be changed through a slow process 
wherein more men and gear were funneled into a specific sector.232 However, the introduction of 
NBC weapons brought with them the ability to change the COFM in a “matter of minutes,”233 
which necessitated new ways of thinking about battles between superpowers. The horrors of the 
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atom and the organic compound could upset the balance of forces drastically on any axis and 
along the entire depth of the enemy positions.234 Fronts were replaced by meeting zones, corridor 
battles, and non-linear combat. Both American and Soviet forces adapted to this new perspective 
of conflict – one that was constantly under the menace of NBCs. It is through this context of 
changing warfare that we see an interesting American interpretation of the Soviet perspective. 
  During the summer of 1979, United States intelligence verified that there had been an 
accidental release of anthrax from a “highly secured military installation in Sverdlovsk.”235 This 
was the first confirmation that the Soviet Union was pursuing micro-organic supplies great 
enough to be weaponized, rather than purely for research or protective purposes, which would 
have gone against the signed and ratified 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. According to 
FM-100-2-1, the biological weapons employed by the USSR include pathogens, such as cholera 
and encephalitis, modified toxins to incite smallpox and diphtheria, and some live forms of 
micro-organisms like bacteria, fungi, or rickettsia.236 These can all be delivered through various 
means including rockets, artillery, airdropped packages, infected animals, and aerosols. Soviet 
research into biological warfare (and it can be assumed the United States was similarly following 
suit) extended into related areas such as “aerobiology, cloud physics, airborne infections and 
disease agent stabilization.”237 To a soldier who was instructed against poisoning or 
manipulating their own weapons in manuals like FM 27-2 Your Conduct in Combat Under the 
Law of War, the threat of horrifying disease and infection evidently existed within the Soviet 
arsenal, and would be intimidating to say the least.238 To someone outside this training, an 
outbreak of plague, anthrax, or cholera would seem unimaginable amid other horrors of war; 
they could lead to debilitating stress, hopelessness, and death. 
 Yet this type of language was not fostered within the training manuals. Just as was the 
case with earlier descriptions of Soviet weaponry in the manuals, biological weapons are 
portrayed as simply another tool to accomplish the task. In describing their possible use, FM 
100-2-1 merely stated that toxins were particularly potent, and could retain that usefulness for 
“many weeks and, in some cases, for months.”239 The OPFOR noted that the use of biological 
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weapons on strategic targets such as food supplies or population centers would “create panic” 
and “disrupt mobilization plans.”240 If inserted into water supplies, like reservoirs, wells, or 
natural systems, they would be “extremely potent and provide wide area coverage.”241 While it 
might be harder to imagine the effects of chemical or nuclear weapons hitting close to home, the 
interaction of the public with disease makes biological weapons perhaps one of the most easily 
imaginable and disconcerting unconventional weapon. Yet here it was discussed plainly for its 
ability to disseminate over a wide area and retain potency for long periods of time, ultimately 
disrupting the movement of troops and weakening rear-area resolve. On the one hand, these 
could be seen as understatements. On the other, the comments point towards a fundamentally 
more objective view of NBC warfare.  
If its personnel so desired, the Department of Defense could have emphasized the pursuit 
of biological weapons in the Soviet arsenal; they could have played up the Red Menace by 
underscoring a Soviet army with an array of deadly toxins, venoms, and diseases at its disposal. 
However, they abstained from doing so. Defense specialists chose to present NBCs in the same 
manner, rhetoric, and tone as any other weapon - not only of those in the USSR’s possession, but 
in the American repertoire as well. Similarly, this decision reappears in further sections on 
chemical and nuclear warfare in our various handbooks. While radiation exposure and poisoning, 
as well as acute reactions to blood, blister, and nerve chemical agents were well quantified, the 
language surrounding them remained clinical and detached. They were just possible tools up to 
the discretion of the Soviet soldier. As the section on biological weapons epitomizes, TRADOC 
and other military organizations rejected fear mongering of NBC weapons and instead 
normalized their use. While some discretion may go into their employment (as the upcoming 
nuclear section will show) they were ultimately discussed, trained for, and deployed without any 
inherently negative or positive connotation. 
 With this came a lack of association with the Soviet soldier as an individual. The 
communist military personnel did not have a predilection towards NBCs and unconventional 
weapons; they did not eagerly await their use. The Soviet soldier was – echoing earlier 
sentiments – an equal opponent to be acknowledged and portrayed in a respectful, if not praising, 
way. According to the training manuals, they were not to be underestimated and begrudged for 
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their ability and armaments. If that were the case, a similar line of thought would have had to 
have been directed against America’s own research and stockpiling of radically dangerous 
weapons. The negative connotation was absent from biological, nuclear, and chemical weapons, 
and so too was it absent from discussions of the Soviet soldier. The USSR was simply 
researching, creating, and using another weapon of war – just as if it were a new form of rifle or 
supersonic bomber. 
 In fact, the NBC section was where the most overt and prevalent praise was put upon the 
Soviet military forces. Most notably in the chemical weapons chapters, the American military 
manuals seemed to portray the USSR as vastly superior, and it is here that readers can notice the 
most direct evidence of respect out of the three primary NBC categories. As FM 100-2: The 
Soviet Army: Operations and Tactics stated, “the Soviets have the largest and most effective 
array of chemical weapons and equipment in the world.”242 Their stockpiles alone “greatly 
exceed those available to the West” and were numerous enough to “sustain large scale use.”243 A 
significant portion of Soviet artillery could simultaneously fire conventional and chemical 
munitions, and to not utilize these weapons would rob the military of “a decisive advantage.”244 
Further, FM-100-2 noted that despite knowledge of the USSR’s “overwhelming advantage, [the 
Soviets] continue to steadily improve” their capabilities.245 In essence, the chemical weapons 
program was portrayed as an unprecedented achievement in NBC warfare. Whether these 
portrayals were overstated, or belied greater American capabilities, the narrative of a feared 
chemical weapons compound saturated the training of the American soldier. 
In combination with lethal synthetic combinations, the Soviets were also equipped with 
what was described as “the best chemical protective and decontamination equipment” and they 
were portrayed as altogether “unmatched by any other military force.”246 This terminology 
covered protective gear, such as suits and filters, as well as decontamination through mobile 
cleaning trucks, ad-hoc NBC centers, and “ingenious” early detection equipment.247 This rhetoric 
again reinforced the concept that the average soldier was backed by an expansive network of 
chemical arms and protective gear engineered with conflict in mind – that is to say, it was 
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durable, relatively simple, and interchangeable.248 The Soviet soldier (or OPFOR, in this specific 
case) was confident in the effectiveness of his equipment. The gear matched the weapons they 
were intended to protect against, bringing with it a security in one’s own ability. After all, the 
doctrine for the Soviet army reinforced the idea that any organization “must be prepared to fight 
in the environment it creates.”249 To employ apocalyptic weapons, a soldier must be willing, 
able, and perhaps even eager to face it himself, even if that meant continuing to fight for days or 
weeks in contaminated environments.250 This reflects a certain degree of mental fortitude and 
determination which could be seen as wildly different from perceptions constructed in non-
military contexts – something which reappears numerous times in the training of these NBC 
soldiers, officers, and other service personnel.  
 As mentioned in earlier sections, military training for Soviet citizens began at a very 
early part of their lives, almost universally taking place before they reached draft age. According 
to American manuals, by introducing military technology, weapons, regimented scheduling, and 
basic physical competitiveness early on, those who were selected for NBC training had a 
foundational knowledge to build on as they headed into the program. As would be expected in 
the most optimistic scenarios, this allowed for a much smoother transition, and much more in-
depth instruction in chemical, nuclear, and biological warfare. Even before he was drafted, the 
typical Soviet male already knew how to put on protective gear, provide first responder aid to 
NBC symptoms, and find adequate shelter depending on the weapon being used. This knowledge 
was only enhanced when a soldier entered formal NBC training, which was described as 
“comprehensive and realistic.”251 Live NBC agents (albeit diluted) were used to enhance the 
dangerous pseudo-reality of training – another reappearing motif which was highlighted 
numerous times in the American manuals.252 Chemical weapons practice, for example, utilized 
nerve, blood, blister, choking, psycho-chemical, and irritant agents. The inherent danger of using 
live agents in simulation brings with it a lesson for actual NBC use: failure has drastic 
consequences.  
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This fatalism was something undoubtedly portrayed in the American manuals as a 
uniquely Soviet perspective of war, fostered by both their military leanings and violent history. 
Evidence within this specific section also spoke to a further mental moulding of Soviet 
inductees. Two important word choices encapsulate this American understanding of their 
opponents; the first states that while “Soviet soldiers are taught to respect the destructive power 
of NBC weapons, they are also indoctrinated against viewing combat in an NBC environment as 
hopeless.”253 Secondly, they also “place a heavy emphasis on individual NBC protective training 
which attempts to psychologically temper personnel to the demands of NBC warfare.”254 As was 
touched on in my section on historiography, indoctrination and psychological training within the 
military was understood as a fairly new concept at the time. Similarly, it was portrayed as 
something the American military could borrow from the Soviets. The mind of a nation’s soldier 
was deemed just as noteworthy as a newfound atomic weapon, Kalashnikov variant, or improved 
aircraft. 
War, however, must go on, and the process of physical training and mental preparation 
facilitated the “continuation of combat operations despite the presence of contaminants.”255 This 
training seemingly represented the physical embodiment of the Soviet ideological and doctrinal 
thought process of chemical, biological and nuclear environments. Soviet commanders, as 
portrayed through the American manuals, were willing to put their soldiers in danger to better 
prepare them for the realistic employment of catastrophic NBC weaponry. American soldiers 
were thus presented with a force – and leadership – that was markedly prepared for 
unconventional warfare. This was an opponent that would not be stopped by an outbreak of 
plague, mustard gas, or nerve agents. They would don their masks, go through decontamination 
procedures, administer antidotes, and keep on fighting. Unlike other possible opponents, such as 
the Viet Cong, NVA, Khmer, Iraqi, Iranian, or North Korean forces, the Soviets were portrayed 
as equal and perhaps better prepared to fight in “contaminated” or “irradiated” environments. 
This perhaps spoke towards a communal Soviet identity which was comprised of resilience, 
fatalism, and an acknowledgement of the necessity and inevitability of violence. At least, that is 
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what an American soldier might come to assume after reviewing chemical and biological warfare 
tactics presented to him. 
 As the manuals move onto nuclear weapons themselves, however, there seems to be a 
divergence from this narrative. It becomes reined in by a discussion on the unique Soviet 
perspective of conflict being escalated to the level of fission and fusion atomic detonations. 
While it may not be the purpose of these works to discuss NBC weapons at length, the absence 
of thorough analysis – especially vis-à-vis nuclear weapons – suggests that these tools of 
destruction were not the principal or future direction of American (and Soviet) military 
thought.256 Certainly, their advent changed the face of war forever, but the manuals themselves 
portrayed a much higher level of trepidation and respect for their destructive powers than other 
more popular media would imply. In order to highlight this divergence, however, we must 
demonstrate how the nuclear sections mimic the other NBC descriptions. 
 Relating to training, it seems that Soviet soldiers and the greater forces surrounding them 
were just as well prepared for nuclear warfare as they were for chemical, biological, and 
conventional environments. As FM-100-2-2 indicated, the Soviets have “moved toward a 
doctrine and force capability to fight decisively at all levels of conflict.”257 The prediction of 
nuclear war in the 1960s made its presence known in overarching USSR training departures of 
the 1970s and 1980s. This was such an extensive initiative that even the most basic doctrinal and 
tactical assumptions were made that the enemy (NATO forces) may escalate at any moment, and 
to prepare accordingly. In an interesting juxtaposition of common Western nuclear narratives, the 
Soviets were portrayed as expecting a detonation from NATO rather than the other way around. 
Therefore, they prepared to fight in the corridors between blast zones, with fragmented forces, 
and rapid meeting engagements through non-linear combat.258 Whether of their own volition or 
otherwise, when Soviet command wished to transition to nuclear war it did not have to “make a 
complex transition.”259 Orders contained contingency plans for nuclear blasts, fallout, protection, 
and most importantly, continuation of combat. In the Staff Officers Field Manual regarding their 
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use, an example of Soviet policy dictated that there is “little distinction between nuclear and 
nonnuclear operations.”260 That is not to say that the Soviets viewed all war as eventually 
nuclear, but rather that their standard deployment and combat operations required very small 
modifications to react to – or employ - NBC weapons. Just as would later occur with the 
development of high-precision weapon systems, the development of nuclear weapons forced a 
doctrinal shift in the Soviet Armed Forces. The soldier and his entrenched theoretical system was 
adaptive just as well as it was resolute. What remained was to surround him in the proper 
equipment. 
Similar to the chemical and biological arsenals, gear and protection were also described 
as very capable. The majority of nuclear weapons described at length were what are known as 
tactical nuclear weapons – those that would be used on the battlefield to take out a target, an 
opponent, clear defenses or slow an advance, and so on. These could be launched from cannons, 
rockets, and planes. Opposite to these are strategic nuclear weapons, which are used to eliminate 
the enemy’s ability to wage war with targets such as factories, cities, or other larger installations. 
In essence, one can imagine an artillery-fired nuclear shell as tactical – it is intended to influence 
a specific battlefield. The alternative is an intercontinental ballistic missile – intended to 
influence the entire war. Tactical nuclear weapons, smaller in yield but much more mobile, were 
assigned at “all levels from division up,”261 with all of the self-propelled, towed guns, and 
howitzers being nuclear-capable.262 Despite this preparedness, there were no descriptions of 
Soviet leaders being willing to use nuclear weapons with the same promptness as they would 
chemical weapons. The unease that surrounded biological weapons was similarly absent. Instead, 
there was a large focus on the both the unwillingness of the Soviets to use their arsenal of nuclear 
weapons and their determination to persevere if they were in fact forced to launched their 
warheads.  
At the time of our manuals’ publication, United States national policy on nuclear warfare 
was “to deter it by means of a strong nuclear warfare capability.”263 Nuclear weapons should 
only be used when authorized by the President in an attempt to “forcibly change the perceptions 
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of enemy leaders about their ability to win,” demonstrate an undesirable escalation of conflict, 
and “encourage negotiations.”264 But to avoid any notion of a passive nuclear policy the Staff 
Officers Field Manual also reminded readers that this “does not preclude the first use of nuclear 
weapons.”265 The United States had the ability and the will to use nuclear force if necessary, but 
was also careful to portray its likely actions as primarily defensive in nature. The creation and 
stockpiling of weapons was a necessary part of the new world order, but it was something that 
was done with a certain amount of trepidation and quiet resolve, rather than with a dominant 
display of power. 
A similar theme of destructive ability joined with apprehension followed in descriptions 
of Soviet nuclear policy and tactics. In plain words, the American military described that the 
Soviets “would prefer to avoid nuclear warfare.”266 They would not pursue it as an avenue of 
conflict unless there were indications that the enemy was utilizing atomic weapons first. In fact, 
the overriding aim of a Soviet front during the offensive was to stop war from going nuclear by 
“swift, early destruction or neutralization of enemy nuclear weapons by nonnuclear means.”267 
Researcher Lester W. Grau also reiterates this belief, highlighting that by the 1980s and early 
1990s, the members of the Soviet General Staff were instead seeing these weapons of mass 
destruction being replaced by high-precision systems and weaponry.268 There was the Precision 
Location Strike System (PLSS), the Joint Tactical Missile System (JTACMS), and the Joint 
Surveillance and Target Radar System (JSTARS) on the NATO side of the battlefield,269 with 
Warsaw Pact equivalents on the other. Apparently the Soviet Union (and later the Russian 
Federation) decreasingly saw nuclear weapons as an inevitability in war.270 While The Soviet 
Union: A Country Study presented a more intricate view of nuclear policy – such as the debate 
on what means should be used when fighting a “just” war in pursuit of Marxism-Leninism – on 
average the other manuals presented a fairly one-track interpretation of Soviet policy and 
understanding which mirrored the American version. Despite possibly being more prepared, 
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better trained, and mentally fortified American training manuals portrayed the USSR as being 
just as risk-averse as the USA when it came to nuclear weapons. Even in the worst-case 
scenarios, and the bleakest and jaded example of Cold War mentality, PAM 550-95 describes 
that the USSR believed that if nuclear war were to break out, it would “be fought in and confined 
to Western and Central Europe,” so that both “the United States and Soviet territory might 
escape nuclear devastation.”271 Realistically, there was sentiment on both sides to “build-down” 
what was believed to be “the most dangerous arsenal ever to threaten mankind.”272 Strategically, 
nuclear weapons had the power to end wars and the world as we knew it. Tactically, they were 
prepared for and produced by military cadres. In the end, perhaps nuclear weapons were simply 
not feasible as tools of war. They became the purview of political rather than military leaders, 
since while armed forces may develop and maintain them, ultimately they refrained from using 
nuclear weapons and instead left their employment in the hands of American and Soviet heads of 
state.  
Following our discussions of praise, critique, and identity, the discussion of NBC 
weaponry acts as an example case for all three avenues of analysis. Here, the praise was laid on 
the amazing abilities of the Soviet chemical divisions. Tutting appeared against hidden and faulty 
biological research facilities. And, ultimately, the altogether deterministic response to possible 
use of NBC weapons spoke toward a familiarly dogged Soviet mentality: no matter what 
happens, they will persevere and continue. But, absent was the imagery of a paranoid silo 
commander with his finger on the button. From the evidence presented here, American trainees 
and officers would have to see the Soviets in a light distinct from the civilian and cultural life. 
Though there was significant variation between the presentation of nuclear and 
biological/chemical weapons, altogether it was a very tempered amount of respect and 
admiration with a tinge of wariness. NBCs were neither dishonourable nor completely 
acceptable. Not only were the effects of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons explained and 
quantified in detail, but they were discussed in a matter-of-fact tone which belied the truth of 
their use. No matter how destructive a new weapon is, there will always be someone to use it, 
and hopefully someone to survive, and continue on to fight another day. Therefore any trainee 
must be prepared to fight on in the event of disaster. NBC war may end the world as we know it, 
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but the world will continue. American soldiers were taught that their Soviet foes were prepared 
to go along with it. 
Unfortunately, such a grand issue like weapons of mass destruction and their employment 
raises more questions than it answers, and, ultimately, highlights an ongoing theme within this 
thesis itself. Did the nuclear policy demonstrate a certain amount of restraint on the Soviet side, 
or did it reflect a quiet confidence in their massive amount of manpower? Was it a skewed 
American presentation set to drum-up more funding? Did such detached and clinical descriptions 
normalize the horror of NBC weapons? While American military authors took little credence 
from their civilian compatriots, the complexity and depth of such a representation forces readers 
to acknowledge that a Cold War opponent like Soviets soldiers could be reduced to flat 
characters at the end of a shooting range, or representatives of an omniscient and omnipresent 
communist threat that sought to invade American households and minds. This also speaks to the 
amount of restraint, respect, and mental acuity on the party of American military authors who 
presented the Soviets as such complex entities. 
Further, it is essential to note that a concept of commonality between the Self and the 
Other, the American and the Soviet soldier, has been found and taught to fresh recruits despite 
the differences highlighted between culture, ideology, belief, and political directorate. The 
camaraderie of soldierly life and the lived experience of training and indoctrination has evidently 
fomented a reasoned and mediating discourse. While this may not take into account unofficial 
commentaries, undocumented training, and personal experiences, there is still some meaning to 
be found in the tomes of a military which has long since been left behind during a new War on 
Terror. According to official doctrine, at least, Cold War recruits were not fed meaningless 
propaganda and tuned to hate their opponent. Instead, they were pushed toward learning about 
the complexities of the Soviets, their unique strengths and weaknesses, their communist 
ideologies and how all of these things affected their fighting capability. While the manuals 
provide great insight into how the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s American military viewed fusion 
weapons, USSR training, or Kalashnikov rifles, their enduring legacy is one that demonstrates 
how the United States – or any global power – should view an opponent that they are seemingly 
committed to combatting. 
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Legacy and Concluding Thoughts 
 I began this investigation based purely out of an interest in how American soldiers, in the 
midst of a global and seemingly apocalyptic Cold War, were taught about their imagined and real 
opponents. Initially, I assumed that their training would simply reinforce stereotypes found in 
popular propaganda where notions of the Red Menace, the evil empire, and the communist threat 
were commonplace. Academics, politicians, entertainers, businessmen, and popular culture 
producers all played a role in fostering a sense of danger, so why would this not be the case in 
military scholarship as well? Instead, analysis into the archive of training manuals opened up a 
complex and inviting spectrum of imagery. Here, Americans were instructed that, yes, Soviet 
servicemen and women were different, but the tone that was used to impart this idea was 
understated. Framing an entire culture in measured (albeit complex) tones was a welcome 
reprieve from the jingoism of specific cultural products. The manuals wound up not being 
dogmatic regurgitations of propaganda; nor did they seem to exaggerate threats in order to 
increase funding to the military. They provided information - not doses of ideology – to 
American citizens and soldiers-in-training.   
A close examination of the language and content of these works tells us something 
interesting about the Cold War itself. It seems facile to say, but they demonstrate that the conflict 
was more complicated and less one-dimensional than people who lived through the era might 
remember. Perhaps more intriguingly, these sturdy tomes suggest that military institutions, which 
are often considered monolithic and unimaginative in nature, were able to cut through the fears 
that resonated in popular and political discourse to offer reasoned, balanced, and respectful 
assessments of their foe. Out of the myriad of possible source bases and lenses through which to 
examine the Cold War, that the American military educational system could stand out as a 
bastion of judicious rhetoric and balanced portrayal is fascinating in its own right. When 
reflecting on the military’s status and influence for both American individuals and society itself, 
this evidence adds yet another layer to the complex legacy of the Cold War. 
Contextualized in our own pressing times, however, it seems more relevant than I had 
ever hoped it could be. A little over a year ago, Lieutenant Colonel Michael A. Adelberg of the 
Strategic Studies Institute stated that, in light of Russia’s internal politics and external activities 
in Ukraine, Crimea, and Syria, U.S. leaders and policymakers “should remain ever-cognizant of 
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the Soviet background of Russian foreign policy.”273 As the United States military reassess the 
importance of training for high-intensity conflicts and ramps up NATO exercises in the Black 
Sea, the Baltics, and Eastern Europe at large, there is some solace to be taken from the 
moderated analysis of Soviet-era Department of Defense publications. Likened to a new Cold 
War, expansionism and brinksmanship have retained their weighty implications in an era of 
draining propaganda campaigns, “fake news,” and the fevered pitch of national, cultural, and 
identity politics. In the time it took to research and compose this work, our world has become 
increasingly divided by more imaginary lines in the sand. However, it is heartening to know that 
even when the world perceived itself to be on the brink of annihilation, there were still mediums 
where this type of polarizing rhetoric was eschewed for common sense understanding. Just as it 
persevered during the Cold War, sound scholarship might still prevail in the end – even if some 
of it stems from unexpected sources in the blood and muck of military contexts. 
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